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At the time they occurred, the savings and loan insolvencies were considered the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression. Contrary to what was then believed, and in 
sharp contrast with 2007-09, they in fact had little macroeconomic significance.  S&L 
remediation cost between 2 and 3 percent of GDP, whereas TARP and the 
conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie actually made money for the U.S. Treasury. But 
the direct cost of government remediation is largely irrelevant in judging macro 
significance.  What matters is the cumulative output loss associated with and plausibly 
caused by failing financial institutions.  I estimate output losses for 1981-1984, 1991-
1998 and 2007-2026 (the latter utilizing forecasts and projections along with actual data 
through 2015) and, for a final comparison, 1929-41. The losses associated with 2007-09 
have been truly disastrous – in the same order of magnitude as the Great Depression. The 
S&L failures were, in contrast, inconsequential. Macroeconomists and policy makers 
should reserve the word crisis for financial disturbances that threaten substantial damage 
to the real economy, and continue efforts ex ante to identify systemically important 
financial institutions in advance. 
 
JEL Codes:  E32, E44, G21, G28 
 




       The Savings & Loan Insolvencies and the Costs of Financial Crises 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The extraordinary financial crisis of the early twenty first century and subsequent 
recession and slow recovery invite, indeed almost compel us to reexamine past history in 
the light of new benchmarks.  Prior to 2007-2009, the 1982 recession was the most severe 
the U.S. economy had experienced since the Great Depression, and the savings and loan 
insolvencies considered our worst financial disturbance since those dark days.  The S&L 
failures and their consequences – now more than a quarter century in the past -- are a 
natural object for reassessment.  
When they occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the insolvencies were 
considered a very big deal. The legacy of the earlier consensus is revealed by this: it is 
difficult even today to say or write the words “savings and loan” without following them 
with the word “crisis.” The language used in numerous articles, monographs, reviews, 
and book length treatments reinforced and reflected this designation.  James Barth, 
Martin Lowi, and Lawrence White each published books in 1991, and each used the word 
debacle in their title. So too did Ned Eichler in 1989, as well as the authors of the 1993 
report of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement.1  Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo (1989), one of the best journalistic accounts, 
described the events as “the biggest financial disaster since the Great Depression” (p. 4), 
words echoed in Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman: “one of the worst financial disasters of 
                                                 
1The word “debacle” appeared in the report’s title and seventy times in the text.   
 2 
the twentieth century” (1997, p. 1). This evaluation was shared by the general public, 
policy makers, and scholars, including academic, business, and government economists.    
A 1992 Congressional Budget Office study employing typically hyperbolic 
language reflected contemporary assessments: The amount the crisis had already cost the 
economy was “startling” (p. ix) and “exorbitant” (p. 1); the waste was of “incredible 
magnitude” (p. 1). Federal payments and borrowing associated with remediation were 
“huge”; the 1980s real estate bubble was “giant” (p. 11). The accumulated losses for the 
deposit insurance funds were “humongous” (p. 13) and the thrift crisis had “reduced the 
economy’s overall output severely since the early 1980s” (p. 29).   
The 2007-09 financial crisis and ensuing recession and slow recovery, however, 
offers a new standard of comparison, at least for the post-Depression period in the United 
States. In the S&L retrospectives in the late 1980s and 1990s the predominant concern 
was the impact of the insolvencies on the U.S. Treasury. The focus was on the cost of 
remediation and how it might have been lessened by a different set of policy actions. A 
subsidiary theme was the misallocation of physical capital and wasted resources during 
the boom, which arguably influenced the subsequent trajectory of potential output 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1992; National Commission, 1993, p. 5).2   There was, 
however, virtually no consideration given to the possible role of financial disturbances in 
triggering a recession and slow recovery associated with a prolonged output gap and 
significant cumulative output loss.   
                                                 
2 In contrast with the excessive attention paid to the cost of remediation, the possible connections between 
distortions during a boom and the subsequent trajectory of potential warrants further investigation and 
evaluation, particularly as it may apply to other episodes such as 2007-09. 
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Here is the central argument of this paper: If financial disturbances, whether 
remediated or not, pose little threat to the real economy, they should not be considered a 
financial crisis.3  This criterion was simply not considered in the post-mortems on the 
insolvencies conducted in the 1990s, and differs from the definition of financial crisis 
offered by Laeven and Valencia (2012), as summarized in Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor 
(2014, p. 19): “a situation in which there are significant signs of financial distress and 
losses in wide parts of the financial system that lead to widespread insolvencies or 
significant policy interventions.”  The essence of the difference is this:  It is possible to 
have widespread distress and insolvencies without significant output loss, as well as the 
opposite: a deep recession, such as one brought about by restrictive monetary policy, that 
is not preceded by widespread financial disturbances.   
A reexamination of the S&L insolvencies, what led up to them, and what their 
consequences were focuses attention on the desirability of identifying ex ante 
systemically important and, by exclusion, systemically unimportant financial institutions.  
Systemically unimportant institutions can fail, or threaten to fail, without holding the real 
economy hostage. 
At the time they occurred, the savings and loan insolvencies were considered the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Contrary to what was then believed, and 
in sharp contrast with 2007-09, they in fact had little macroeconomic significance. S&L 
remediation cost taxpayers considerably: between 2 and 3 percent of GDP, whereas 
TARP and the conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie actually made money for the U.S. 
                                                 
3 Failures might be a ‘crisis’ from the point of view of the institutions affected, just as the failure of a 
computer company might be a crisis for its owners and creditors. In asking whether a set of financial 
disturbances represents a crisis I do so from the perspective of the macroeconomy, and policy makers with 
some responsibility for its functioning.     
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Treasury.  But the cumulative output loss associated with the 1991 recession was modest, 
and the link between the insolvencies and that recession tenuous.  This stands in sharp 
contrast with 2007, where the subsequent output loss may ultimately be of the same order 
of magnitude as that associated with the Great Depression, and where the link between 
the financial disturbances and recession and slow recovery is clear. 
Here are lessons to be drawn.  The direct cost of government remediation is largely 
irrelevant in judging macro significance.  What matters is the cumulative output loss 
associated with and plausibly caused by failing financial institutions. It is important to 
differentiate between disturbances posing a significant (and possibly catastrophic) threat 
to the real economy, and those that “merely” involve criminal misconduct and struggles 
over the allocation of losses among creditors and/or taxpayers. This differentiation is 
greatly facilitated if systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are identified in 
advance. 
Section 2 discusses the background and dimensions of the S&L insolvencies.  
Section 3 reviews recent research exploring possible linkages between financial 
disturbances and recessions, with special attention to the treatment of  the insolvencies 
within this literature. Section 4 makes the case that designating a set of financial 
disturbances as a crisis should require the threat or actuality of significant cumulative 
output loss.  Section 5 asks whether financial disturbances should be considered to have 
triggered either the 1980/82 or the1990-91 recessions, and estimates the cumulative 
output loss associated with the 1980/82 downturns. Section 6 explores the widespread 
preoccupation with the costs of remediation and their impact on the Treasury, and the 
ways this preoccupation has influenced interpretations of the S&L insolvencies.  
 5 
Section 7 describes the tenuous links between the insolvencies and the economic 
downturn that began in 1990, and estimates the cumulative output loss associated with 
the 1990-91 recession. Section 8 does the same for 2007-09. Section 8 also  includes an 
estimate of the loss associated with the Great Depression, and provides a table 
summarizing the output losses incident upon the four recession/depression episodes 
examined. Section 9 reviews mechanisms on both the aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply side that may cause financial disturbances to precipitate recession as well as 
damage the growth trajectory of potential output.  Section 10 considers policy lessons, 
explores more speculatively why the S&L insolvencies were originally considered such a 
big deal, and reflects on what may be their lasting impact.   
2.  The S&L Insolvencies:  Background, Magnitudes, Timing 
The S&L meltdown reached its full efflorescence at the end of the 1980s and early 
1990s, a period during which the number of federally insured S&Ls decreased by almost 
half, from 3,234 to 1,645.  From 1986 until its demise in 1989, the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) closed or otherwise resolved 296 institutions with 
assets of $125 billion.  Between 1989 and 1995 the Resolution Trust Corporation did the 
same for 794 institutions with assets of $394 billion.  Curry and Shibut (2000) date the 
episode as running over the ten-year period 1986-1995, measuring from the year in which 
the FSLIC was first declared insolvent to the year in which the Resolution Trust 
Corporation wound down its operations.  Focusing on the years of the worst abuses, 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) situate the events between 1984 and 1991. This is also the 
frame favored by Boyd, Kwak, and Smith (2005) as well as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 
table A.4.1, p. 390). Laeven and Valencia (2012, p. 26) identify 1988 as the start and end 
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year of what they describe as a “borderline” financial crisis, a characterization also 
accepted by Jordá, Schularick, and Taylor (2012).    Lindgren et al (1996, p. 34) describe 
the entire period stretching from 1980 to 1992 as marked by “significant” banking 
problems. Whatever the exact time period identified, the roots of these developments can 
be traced at least as far back as the 1960s and 1970s.    
Savings & Loans, to an even greater degree than commercial banks, specialized in 
borrowing short and lending long, which they did principally in the form of mortgages 
with fixed nominal interest rates.  The Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall) prohibited 
interest on checking accounts, and gave the Federal Reserve power to limit interest rates 
paid by commercial banks on time deposits. During the repressed financial conditions 
and low inflation of the 1950s S&Ls were, on balance, financially healthy institutions, 
and contributed to financing the postwar housing boom.  In the 1960s, however, inflation 
began to creep up, and in 1966, as inflation and interest rates rose along with spending on 
the Vietnam War, Regulation Q caps were extended to S&Ls and mutual savings banks.  
The intent was to preserve a healthy spread between rates paid on deposits and rates 
earned on (new) loans, assisting thrifts in overcoming losses on previously issued fixed 
rate mortgages that resulted from rising interest rates. The financial condition of S&Ls 
had become much more fragile; Samuelson (1967) termed them “technically insolvent” 
during the 1966 credit crunch.  
Their financial health continued to deteriorate in the 1970s, particularly after 1977. 
Accelerating inflation and rising nominal interest rates interacted with Regulation Q to 
produce widespread disintermediation: an outward flow of deposits which, if 
unstaunched, forced a fire sale of illiquid assets.  Lowi estimates that in 1981 four out of 
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five thrift institutions were losing money, and “virtually all”, if marked to market, were 
underwater (1991, pp. 14, 34, 72; see also Pikzer, 1989, p. 71). There is wide agreement 
that by the time of the 1980 and 1982 recessions, most S&Ls were market or balance 
sheet insolvent (Kane, 1985, table 4.6; Admati and Hellwig, 2013, p. 54).   
The parlous condition of the industry in the early 1980s, which set the stage for the 
even more disastrous period that followed, was due principally to interest rate risk, not 
bad loans or fraud. Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo (1989, p. 323) argue that had adjustable 
rate mortgages (ARMs) been allowed nationally in the 1970s (as they were in California 
starting in 1974) and had subsequent regulatory/legislative changes been limited to 
eliminating caps on deposits rates and not included an expansion of asset powers, the 
industry might have remained healthy and retained its niche position in the financial 
ecosphere. Black (2005), appears to support this view, although one should note that the 
subsequent relaxation of restraints on what kinds of mortgage products financial 
institutions could offer did not, in the 2000s, end happily.  During the 1970s ARMs were 
repeatedly blocked in Congress, under pressure from both homebuilders and consumer 
groups.  They became available nationally in 1982, under the terms of the Garn-St. 
Germain Depository Institutions Act.   
         Between 1981 and 1986 the sections of Regulation Q specifying maximum interest 
rates payable on time deposits were eliminated.  This ameliorated the disintermediation 
problem, but at the cost of a rapidly rising cost of funds, which meant that operating 
income, properly accounted, remained generally in the red.  At the same time, regulatory 
and legislative changes at the state and federal level greatly expanded asset powers. 
These changes combined with the increase in deposit insurance ceilings from $40,000 to 
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$100,000 per account (1980) and the removal of the 5 percent limit on the ratio of 
brokered to total deposits (1982) created a dangerously explosive political and economic 
environment.4   
A common narrative is that insolvent institutions with little to lose could outbid 
solvent institutions for deposits and at the same time offer lower interest rates to 
borrowers, ultimately worsening the losses of the insolvent institutions and sapping the 
financial health of those with remaining positive equity. The “gambling for resurrection” 
language, though colorful, is, however, too sanitized.  It assumes a unitary actor view of 
S&L institutions and, reflecting the ethically neutral language of moral hazard common 
to economics and insurance law, soft-pedals the contributions of insider looting (Akerlof 
and Romer, 1993), other forms of misconduct, and political corruption.  
During the 1980s, unscrupulous individuals established new S&Ls or acquired 
existing ones using very little of their own money (and sometimes just land with an 
inflated appraisal), and took advantage of the new rules and absence of supervision to 
pursue huge gains.  These individuals were drawn by opportunity, not “forced” into risky 
behavior by impersonal macroeconomic trends or ill-considered government rules.  
If the sorry state of the industry in 1980 was the consequence of interest rate risk, 
its situation in 1990 was, from an accounting perspective, the result primarily of the 
impact of very risky and/or poorly underwritten loans and investments on asset quality at 
                                                 
4 In April of 1982, regulators also eliminated the rule requiring a minimum of 400 shareholders, with at 
least 125 local citizens, and no individual owning more than 10 percent or “controlling group” owning 
more than 25 percent of the equity. The granting of a thrift charter had traditionally required broad 
community support. A related rule modification allowed land rather than cash to be used in capitalizing a 
thrift. Both changes helped developers, sometimes corrupt, in acquiring failing S&Ls.  In addition, Garn-St. 
Germain increased from 20 to 40 percent the share of assets that could be held in (much riskier) 
nonresidential assets, and allowed loans to borrowers with no money down. Finally, thrifts no longer faced 
geographic restrictions on where they could make loans. 
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a time when funds to lend were increasingly easily available. The moderation of inflation 
and consequent reduction in nominal interest rates (because of the fall of the inflation 
premium) did unwind some of the balance sheet damage inflicted between 1977 and 
1982.5  As nominal interest rates declined and the economy improved in 1983, the market 
value of mortgage loans made at low rates in the 1970s recovered substantially, although 
refinancings limited this effect.6   Still, between 1982 and 1983 total accumulated losses 
in the S&L industry decreased by about 75 percent. In retrospect, the best thing to have 
done would have been to have ceased regulatory forbearance and resolved those 
institutions then underwater. This would have cost at that time approximately $25 billion 
(National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, 
1993, p. 2) 
        Instead, the balance sheets and income statements of insolvent S&Ls were made to 
look healthier than they were by a variety of regulatory and legislative initiatives.  The 
continuation of regulatory forbearance allowed zombie (insolvent but still operating) 
institutions to remain open, forestalling resolution, and encouraged the formation of new 
institutions. With equity absent or gone, officers, directors, and owners had little 
                                                 
5 This may have encouraged regulators to continue forbearance, reinforcing unrealistic hopes that the 
institutions could “grow” their way out of their problems.  For many institutions, the only possible path to 
that outcome was by making very risky loans and investments that happened to pay off. 
6 This apparent strengthening of financial condition was augmented by legislative and regulatory changes 
in 1980, 1981, and 1982.  An S&L in trouble could issue an “Income Capital Certificate” which could be 
sold to the FSLIC and counted as capital.  Those buying an insolvent S&L could count the negative net 
worth as goodwill, and also include it as capital.  Finally, in January, net worth (capital) requirements were 
reduced from 4 to 3 percent.  S&Ls were also encouraged to remove money-losing mortgage loans from 
their balance sheets by selling them. They were then allowed to amortize losses over the projected life of 
the loan and to offset these losses against taxes paid during the previous ten years, thereby receiving  
retroactive refunds from the IRS (Lewis, p. 121). Major Wall Street firms bought the loans at substantial 
discounts, securitized them, and in many instances then sold the securities back to S&Ls. In 1982 S&Ls 
sold off $50 billion worth of low interest rate mortgages, generating $3 billion of tax refunds, and then 
turned around and acquired $24 billion of mortgage backed securities (National Commission, 1993, pp. 33, 
45). 
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incentive not to engage in risky lending or, if they were fraudulently minded, not direct it 
towards themselves or their collaborators.   
Twenty-year phase in rules for a 3 percent capital requirement allowed a newly 
chartered S&L to hold just .15 percent equity against its assets during its first year, with 
the rest of its assets funded by insured deposits – permitting a leverage ratio of 665 to 1.  
Under these circumstances a tiny increase in the value of assets could be enormously 
profitable to owners.  Even a five year old S&L could hold as little as three quarters of a 
percent capital against its assets, implying a leverage ratio of 132. Existing S&Ls also 
benefitted from a five year averaging rule:  the 3 percent capital requirement applied not 
to current deposits but to the average held over the previous five years.  This put an 
additional premium on rapid growth, since an S&L growing at 25 percent per year could 
reduce its effective capital requirement to 2 percent.7   
These initiatives invited increasingly reckless lending,8 and a continued flow of 
funds to doomed projects, causing a major deterioration in the quality of assets.  
Combined with the gradual demise of Regulation Q and the rise of brokered deposits in 
                                                 
7 In December of 1983, the net worth requirement for a new S&L was raised to 7 percent, but the 20 year 
phase in for new S&Ls was not eliminated until January of 1985. The five year deposit averaging rule also 
began to be phased out in that year (National Commission, 1993, p. 55).  
8 Calavita, Pontell and Tillman, (1997, pp. 33-42) make a compelling case that the data simply do not 
support the ‘minimal fraud’ interpretation generally advanced by economists.  The entire industry if marked 
to market was insolvent, yet only a third of institutions engaged in high risk lending.  The portfolios of 
institutions that did so were remarkably undiversified, often concentrated in ADC (Acquisition, 
Development, and Construction) loans, direct investments which were among the most risky an S&L could 
make.  To have any hope of making a profit, such loans require strong underwriting and internal controls, 
yet these were almost always absent or lax, and LTOB (loan to one borrower) regulations and restrictions 
on insider lending were routinely violated.  Every single institution engaging in high risk lending failed 
with large losses; this was as true in the California economy of the mid 1980s as it was in the overbuilt and 
depressed real estate market in Texas.  The fall of oil prices, an impersonal market force often adduced as 
explanation of why the thrifts struggled in the 1980s, was largely irrelevant in California, yet many of the 
most dramatic thrift failures were in that state. 
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an environment in which all accounts were federally insured up to $100,000,9 a situation 
that at the time seemed catastrophic developed, particularly in the states of Texas and 
California. The 1987 stock market crash gave the distressed industry an additional 
infusion of funds as individuals pulled money from equities and invested in S&L 
certificates of deposit.   
In Texas, brokered deposits fueled lavish executive compensation and risky and 
imprudent lending on undeveloped land and commercial office construction. 
Transactions, particularly in failed institutions, were permeated with self-dealing, 
artificially inflated land values, and other forms of fraud and theft.  California S&Ls used 
brokered deposits and newly expanded asset powers to make large interest rate bets on 
mortgage backed securities. In the early 1980s no one knew which way rates would go: 
some S&Ls took long positions in bonds; others short; it was largely a zero sum game.  
But there was an asymmetry: when rates fell those taking the long position won, and had 
their financial health restored.  Those taking the other side lost, but ultimately it was the 
deposit insurance fund and taxpayers that absorbed the loss.  California S&Ls also used 
millions of dollars of insured deposits to invest in risky junk bonds, as well as fuel 
                                                 
9 The increase in deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000 per account became effective in March of 
1980 with the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA). 
In the summer of 1982 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board eliminated the prior rule that brokered deposits 
could comprise no more than 5 percent of total deposits.  S&Ls could now attract all the “hot money” they 
wanted by advertising for them directly, or by using brokered deposits supplied by Merrill Lynch and 
others.  On top of this a change in rules liberalizing insurance coverage on union pension fund deposits, 
made additional stocks and flows of money, sometimes connected to organized crime, available to S&Ls.  
Unscrupulous loan brokers, such as Mario Renda’s First United Fund, often demanded the S&Ls engage in 
“linked lending” to specified borrowers in exchange for deposits (see Pizzo, Fricker and Muolo, 1991). 
Most of these loans, unsurprisingly, were never paid back. 
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speculative land development in other states such as Arizona (see Pilzer, 1989, chs. 5 and 
6).10   
The bottom line, generalizing across some of the regional differences, is that the 
positive balance sheet effects of nominal interest rate declines in the early 1980s were 
swamped by the massive deterioration in the quality of loans and investments made in the 
remainder of the decade. By 1989 accumulated losses due to the post-1983 deterioration 
of asset quality exceeded those attributable to the high interest rates of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s (Ely, 2008, based on data from the FSLIC and the Resolution Trust 
Corporation). If fraud played a small role in bringing the industry to its condition at the 
start of the 1980s, it, along with political corruption, was omnipresent in the worst 
failures thereafter.11  The cost of remediation, along with the salience of misconduct and 
                                                 
10 Junk bond investments were concentrated in 11 large S&Ls, all of which failed.  Overall, however, 
investments in junk bonds were not a preponderant cause of the S&L failures (National Commission, 1993, 
p. 4) 
11 The profitability of and opportunities for fraud increased with regulatory and legislative changes in the 
1980s, attracting to the industry many who were or would became white collar criminals, including some 
with organized crime connections. The GAO compared 26 failed institutions with 26 similar institutions 
that survived. Fraud and insider abuse were evidence in every failed S&L, but only a few of those that 
survived (National Commission, 1993, p. 70). Not all officers, directors, owners, borrowers, or brokers 
availed themselves of the opportunities, and there are grey areas separating behavior merely unethical from 
that which was clearly illegal. That said, economists have often gone out of their way to downplay the 
significance of criminal misconduct in contributing to the insolvencies (see Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman, 
1997, pp. 18-19; 33-42).  Lawrence White, a member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board from 
November of 1986 through August of 1989, warned in his 1991 book that “any treatment that focuses 
largely…on fraudulent and criminal activities is misguided and misleading” (1991, p. 117).   This language 
can be defended – obviously there were other forces at play – but is too strong: see Pizzo, Fricker, and 
Muolo (1989), Calavita, Pontell, and Tilman (1997), or Black (2005), among others. Perhaps the most 
dispositive evidence is this: Calavita el al (p. 31) report that a criminal referral was filed in two thirds (455 
out of 686) of the institutions under Resolution Trust Corporation control as of May 19, 1992, with an 
average loss per institution due to fraud of over $12 million.  Law breaking was sometimes “insider” 
(officers, directors, or owners), sometimes ‘outsider’ (borrowers and loan brokers), and sometimes so 
convoluted as to make it almost impossible to make this distinction. Zingales (2015) challenged academics 
to acknowledge the law and rule breaking propensities of those in the finance profession. He tabulated the 
fines paid by financial institutions since the 2008 financial crisis: $138 billion by the end of 2014 criminal 
prosecutions had been almost entirely absent). 
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political corruption, is part of why so many at the time thought that these insolvencies 
were such a big deal.   
In 1993 the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement identified federal deposit insurance as the primary enabling cause of the 
S&L debacle, and recommended that such insurance be limited to “Monetary Service 
Companies” – essentially mutual funds holding short term easily valued public and 
private paper.  Such funds would be marked to market on a regular basis, required to hold 
reserves, have access to the Fed’s discount window, and be subject to risk based capital 
requirements and deposit insurance levies.  The burdens of providing effective regulation 
and supervision would be dramatically reduced because the insurance would be limited to 
these institutions.  This, the report authors believed, would eliminate the likelihood of 
future debacles. What the report authors (and many other authors) meant by a debacle has 
become clearer with the benefit of hindsight.  It was not necessarily the failure of 
systemically important institutions posing threats of major cumulative output loss.  
Rather it was raids on the US Treasury by corrupt lenders and insured depositors with no 
incentives to monitor lending behavior.   
Insured deposits may have contributed to the S&L debacle, but it is questionable 
that they were the primary culprit. In their absence the flow of brokered deposits chasing 
high yields would have been attenuated.  But eliminating or reducing deposit guarantees 
would not necessarily have reduced the likelihood either of financial institution failures 
or of macroeconomically significant crises.  For example, it is generally agreed that 
financial disturbances were among the factors precipitating the Great Depression. Yet all 
of that preceded federal deposit insurance. And more recently, many of the institutions 
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implicated in the 2007-09 crisis funded themselves using liabilities other than insured 
deposits.   
3.  The S&L Insolvencies and Recent Economic Literature 
      Following the 2007-2008 financial crisis a number of influential papers and books 
explored the macroeconomic consequences of financial crisis.  These included Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009), Ceccetti et al (2009), and Schularick and Taylor (2012).  These works 
brought together two literatures – financial economics and financial history on the one 
hand and macroeconomics and macroeconomic history on the other which, at least after 
the 1930s, had, in the developed world, evolved largely independently of each other.  As 
Ng and Wright wrote in 2013, “In conventional business cycle analysis, emphasis is 
placed on the fluctuations of macroeconomic variables alone. Asset prices, financial 
variables and the financial system are a sideshow” (2013, p. 1122).  Another indication of 
this traditional bifurcation: none of the variables considered by the NBER business cycle 
dating committee is a financial variable referencing money or credit markets.   
 U.S. economic historians knew that financial disturbances were recurring features 
of the nineteenth century, and during the twentieth century had had significant 
consequences in 1907 and again during the Great Depression.  James, McAndrews, and 
Weiman (2013) make a strong case that the panics of 1873, 1893, and 1907, each of 
which was associated with a suspension of specie payments, disrupted the payments 
system, leading in each instance to a downturn in real activity and significant cumulative 
output loss.  Even if the 1929 stock market crash is no longer considered a major 
precipitator of the Depression, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) made four waves of bank 
failures central to their explanation of why the Depression became so much worse in 
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1932 and 1933.  Bernanke (1983), emphasizing the resultant loss of information about the 
credit worthiness of borrowers, enriched their argument.  
But as Schularick and Taylor (2012) demonstrate, the world really did change after 
the Great Depression, and not just in the United States.  On the one hand, the introduction 
of federal deposit insurance and New Deal legislation that tightened and increased the 
transparency of the regulatory system, along with a half century without (in the US) 
comparable financial crisis, led many to push the issue off their radar screens.  Financial 
crises came to be perceived as events that happened in other times and other places.  
While this complacent view took hold, a parallel system of non-bank financial 
institutions grew quietly in the shadows, funding itself with repo and other non-deposit 
liabilities.  Credit aggregates, no longer closely linked to trends in monetary aggregates, 
grew much faster than GDP. Deposit insurance and aggressive monetary interventions, 
reflecting lessons learned from the Great Depression, now rendered the mechanisms 
identified by Friedman and Schwartz, Bernanke, and James, McAndrews, and Weiman 
largely irrelevant. Nevertheless, it turned out that the United States and much of the rest 
of the world was still vulnerable to financial crises that could still bring about significant 
cumulative output loss.  
Misplaced confidence that this was not the case was reflected in the first line of 
Richard Sylla’s contribution to Government and the American Economy: “Most informed 
observers today would agree that the United States has just about the best financial 
system in the world. Its problems are newsworthy because they arise in the context of a 
well-functioning financial order, not one that is disorderly” (2007 p. 115).    
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If the timing of Sylla’s essay was unfortunate, Reinhart and Rogoff’s was the 
opposite, since it was clear by the time their book appeared (2009) that financial crises 
were not just events of historical interest or that occurred in other countries with less 
developed or robust financial systems.  Nevertheless, Reinhart and Rogoff persisted in 
viewing most banking crises as transmission and possibly amplifying mechanisms, with a 
“real shock …typically trigger(ing) the crisis” (2009, p. 142).  They thus played down the 
possibility that a financial crisis could have its own independent dynamic, and exercise a 
causal influence on economic activity in its own right. Schularick and Taylor and 
Ceccetti et al, in contrast, were more receptive to this possibility. 
All of these researchers, however, took advantage of the fact that prior to the 2007 
crisis, a number of financial historians had tried to define more precisely what a financial 
crisis was, and using these definitions, develop databases and chronologies of crises and 
crisis periods.  Reinhart and Rogoff, and to an even greater degree, Schularick and Taylor 
and Ceccetti et al took and in some cases refined these panel datasets and engaged them 
with standard macroeconomic variables in order to explore the possible macro 
consequences of crises. 
Their work was influential, since these authors developed empirically an argument 
to which then current events had made many receptive.  As a result many now accept that 
the growth of credit aggregates, leverage, and financial fragility matter in understanding 
the depth and duration of subsequent recessions and slow recoveries, as well as damage 
to the trajectory of potential output.  That said, it is worth stepping back and asking what 
may be at stake from a research perspective in the arguments developed in this paper.   
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Both Reinhardt/Rogoff and Schularick/Taylor consider the S&L insolvencies to 
have been a financial crisis.  Caprio and Klingebiel had earlier classified it as such, 
although viewing the S&L experience as a “borderline or smaller” financial crisis (1997, 
p. 7).12  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, p. 215) also hedged, describing the insolvencies as 
“one of thirteen financial crises in rich countries representing more minor event[s]…that 
were not catastrophic”, and date it as running from 1984 through 1981.  But, when push 
came to shove, they included the insolvencies as one of two financial crises experienced 
by the United States since 1945 (2009, Table 10.4, p. 153).   
Schularick and Taylor (2012, table A1) did the same, listing 1984 as one of seven 
post-Civil War crisis dates for the United States (they identified start but not end dates). 
In making their classifications they relied on multiple chronologies, including 
Laeven/Valencia and Reinhart/Rogoff.  The former (2012, p.  26) had identified 1988 as 
the beginning and endpoint of a “borderline” financial crisis.  Schularick and Taylor 
followed Caprio/Klingebiel and Reinhart/Rogoff as opposed to Laeven/Valencia in the 
dating here.   
Cecchetti et al. did not consider there to have been any financial crises in the US 
between 1980 and 2007, and they concluded that “most, but not all, systemic banking 
crises coincide with a sharp contraction in output from which it takes several years to 
recover” (2009, p. 2). Although placing less emphasis on the possibility that recessions 
were the consequence of financial disturbances that could have their own dynamic, 
Reinhardt and Rogoff made a similar statement: “The fact that most banking crises, 
                                                 
12 See also Boyd, Kwak, and Smith (2005) who reached a similar conclusion, repeating Caprio and 
Klingebiel’s judgment that it was “nonsystemic.” 
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especially systemic ones, are associated with economic downturns is well established in 
the literature” (2009, p. 165).   
By removing from the crisis category events only tenuously linked to a recession 
with modest cumulative output loss, insistence that the S&L insolvencies were not a 
financial crisis would strengthen the measured empirical association between financial 
crisis and output loss reported in Reinhart/Rogoff and Schularick/Taylor. But the 
definition of financial crisis proposed in this paper raises a broader issue.  Econometric 
methods test hypotheses as well as estimate relationships or parameters.  These various 
works do both:  their null hypothesis, which they wish to reject, is that financial 
disturbances and what predisposes to them are neutral with respect to the macroeconomy.  
Because definitions of financial crisis, such as those offered by Laeven and Valencia, 
make no reference to macroeconomic variables this looks like a potentially informative 
exercise.  
 The problem with financial crisis chronologies, however, is that, in spite of the 
efforts to tighten definitions, classification remains highly subjective.  These are not hard 
and fast determinations. People shade their decisions, distinguishing between (ordinary?) 
financial crises, ‘borderline’ crises, and systemic crises.  One of the challenges in dating 
banking crises precisely is that, as Frydl (1999, p. 1) notes, unlike currency crises, they 
are “spread out over time, with no clear beginning or end.”  Preconditions evolve over 
years, and these can be as important in understanding outcomes as what we might 
identify as an immediate trigger. 
The central argument of this paper is that macroeconomists should reserve the 
crisis designation for financial disturbances that coincide with or threaten substantial 
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damage to the real economy.  Financial disturbances, even if widespread, that do not 
satisfy this criterion should not be considered systemic nor, from a macroeconomic 
perspective, a crisis.  They don’t belong in the crisis database, at least not one used by a 
macroeconomist.  This is a delicate matter in real time, because when financial 
institutions run into trouble, no matter what the politics of their executives, they hunger 
for a government rescue.  And the standard argument for rescue is that failure to do so 
will cause significant cumulative output loss (‘let us fail, and the economy goes down 
with us’).  It should not be such a difficult issue in retrospect. 
If the criterion proposed in this paper is rigorously adhered to, we can retire the 
category of systemic financial crisis by recognizing it as involving redundant wording.  
All, not just most systemic banking crises would then coincide with a sharp contraction in 
output from which it takes several years to recover. The difference between all and most 
would reflect the removal of previously misclassified events.  We will no longer be 
testing the null hypothesis, because we will explicitly have referenced left hand (macro) 
variables in selecting right hand side regressors (periods of financial crisis).  Non-
neutrality of true crisis events will have become part of the maintained hypothesis: our 
focus will be entirely on estimating how large is the effect. The excluded financial 
disturbances may still be of interest to financial historians, just as the demise of Data 
General or the Digital Equipment Corporation is to historians of the computer industry.  
But not to macroeconomists. 
Before developing the argument that the insolvencies in the S&L industry don’t 
warrant designation as a financial crisis, because they don’t measure up in terms of their 
associated cumulative output loss, two controversies regarding the chronology of post-
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World War II financial disturbances in the United States require exploration. Lopez-
Salido and Nelson (2010) vigorously protest the Caprio and Klingebiel (1997)/ Reinhardt 
and Rogoff (2009) identification of 1984-1991 as crisis years, arguing instead for 1982-
84 and 1988-91. 1988-91 is justified on the grounds that, indeed, most of the S&L 
insolvencies were concentrated in those years.   
The argument for 1982-84 is more problematic.  Lopez-Salido and Nelson argue 
that August of 1982, when the Mexican government threatened default on its sovereign 
debt, marked the beginning of a two-year period of financial crisis in the U.S.  But the 
U.S. economy was already well into a severe downturn by August, and whatever the 
vulnerability of U.S. commercial lenders to their LDC lending, there is no way the 1982 
Mexican crisis can plausibly be held responsible for the depth of the recession that year.13   
The second and related question is this.  The 1982 (and 1980) recessions are 
generally not considered to have been recessions accompanied (or caused) by financial 
crisis?14   Should they be?  This question took on more than historical importance 
because of the rapid recovery after 1982 in comparison with the experience in 2007-2009.  
Did the postponement of reckoning in the early 1980s - the band aids represented by 
regulatory “forbearance” and accounting “innovations” that allowed S&L institutions to 
avoid being shut down or merged -- disguise a reality, that the two sharpest post-
                                                 
13Lopez-Salido and Nelson (2010, p. 11) mention the alleged $1 billion exposure of Continental Illinois to 
Mexican debt.  But due to central bank and IMF lending to the Mexican government, that portion of the 
bank’s balance sheet ultimately played a negligible role in its demise.  Lopez-Salido and Nelson’s claim 
that the rescue of Continental in July of 1984 “represented the culmination of the U.S. banking crisis 
associated with LDC debt problems” does not stand up to scrutiny. 1982-84 was, moreover, marked by a 
very strong recovery in the real economy, suggesting that whatever the set of financial disturbances 
identified in these years they were not macroeconomically significant. 
14 The NBER identifies a recession in 1980 as well as in 1982, the former resulting from the abortive initial 
efforts by Chairman Volcker to break the backbone of inflationary expectations. For expositional 
convenience, I will refer to these efforts and their consequences as a single recessionary event. 
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Depression downturns (1982 and 2007-09) are more similar than has been acknowledged, 
in the sense that the former as well as the latter was associated with financial crisis?    
The classifications of both the 1982 and 1990-91 recessions have implications for 
the generalization that recessions accompanied by financial crisis experience weaker and 
much longer recoveries to potential than do those which are not. The 1982 recession was 
very deep – indeed, as measured by the peak unemployment rate, it was deeper than 
2007-09. But recovery from it was also very rapid (Bordo and Haubrich, 2010).  It was a 
V-shaped recession, and the comparatively slow recovery from 2007-2009 became an 
issue in the 2012 Presidential election.  Some attributed the slow recovery to Obama’s 
“failed” economic policies, while others pointed out that 2007-2009 was accompanied by 
a severe financial crisis whereas 1982 was not. For a number of reasons, it will be 
important to judge whether the recessions of the early 1980s were accompanied and 
perhaps precipitated by (disguised) financial crisis, as well as the more central question of 
whether the relatively mild recession of 1990-91 can be causally linked to the S&L 
insolvencies.          
4.  Cumulative Output Loss and the Definition of Financial Crisis 
There is little dispute that the S&L insolvencies represented a debacle of some 
sort. But were they macroeconomically significant?   I define a set of financial 
disturbances as macroeconomically significant if and only if they threaten to trigger a 
recession and slow recovery that together result or would result in substantial cumulative 
output loss.  Otherwise the disturbances, though they may threaten the survival of 
individual firms, should be of no more concern to policy makers than the prospective 
failure of a computer company.  
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Competition is not a tort. The birth and death of enterprise is an expected feature 
of a vibrant economy. In most cases threatened failure does not warrant government 
action or intervention.  Financial institutions have, however, often been considered an 
exception to this rule and, as a consequence have generally been more heavily regulated.  
Whether or not the failure or prospective failure of a financial institution justifies 
remediation depends on whether such failure threatens serious damage to the real 
economy.  This in turn depends on whether or not the enterprise(s) about to fail are 
systemically important: how large and interconnected they are, and whether they provide 
services for which there are no close substitutes. 
There is an ex ante and an ex post perspective on this. Ex post, if a set of financial 
disturbances can plausibly be said to have triggered a recession and slow recovery with 
substantial cumulative output loss, that is sufficient evidence of both systemic importance 
and macroeconomic significance.  The Dodd-Frank bill tries to get out in front of this, by 
requiring the identification in advance of systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs). Unremediated or partially remediated failures of SIFIs are macroeconomically 
significant by definition, since prior designation as such means a high likelihood that 
failure would ultimately cause significant cumulative output loss. This paper argues that 
the failure or threatened failure of financial institution(s) that do not meet this criterion 
cannot usefully be described as a financial crisis.  If we argue otherwise, we will likely 
bias policy in favor of socializing losses that should in fact remain private.   
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Many definitions of financial crisis or financial instability do not directly 
reference cumulative output loss.15 Laeven and Valencia (2012, p. 4), for example, 
identify a banking crisis as displaying “significant signs of financial distress in the 
banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, 
and/or bank liquidations)” and “significant banking policy intervention measures in 
response to significant losses in the financial system.”  There is no explicit reference to 
impacts on the real economy. 
Neither the historical fact, ex post, of remediation, nor the cost of such 
remediation to the Treasury, will necessarily tell us much about whether or not the 
failure(s) in question was (were) systemically important.16  In some cases institutions that 
were remediated could have failed with only minimal damage to the macroeconomy. In 
such cases direct remediation, which transfers wealth from some households to others, 
will have had little impact on the real economy.  In other cases remediation (or its 
absence) can have enormous impacts on the trajectories of output and employment.  The 
degree of systemic importance of failing institutions influences the sensitivity of output 
loss to the character, amount, and timing of remediation.  Even where failing institutions 
are systemically unimportant, there will be individuals whose assets will be impaired by a 
failure who will exercise political pressure to be made whole.  As the sequence of 
decisions involving Lehman Brothers and AIG revealed, policy makers need to know in 
advance into which category (systemically important or not systemically important) the 
                                                 
15 Note that adhering to this criterion rigorously will guarantee that recessions following financial crises 
have longer and more drawn out recoveries, since one will have defined the precipitating variable with 
reference to the outcome of interest.   
16 A broad definition of remediation would include direct efforts to shore up the balance sheets of failing 
financial institutions through injections of additional equity, insurance of previously uninsured liabilities, or 
initiatives to increase the value of assets.  One could include as well efforts at fiscal or monetary stimulus 
which can moderate the effects on output and employment of financial institution failure or near failure. 
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threatened failure of a financial institution falls. This is one of the lacunae Dodd-Frank 
aimed to fill; Das (2016) offers a promising methodology that might be used to 
implement this. 
  The critical question to be asked in each instance is whether unremediated 
failure would have, or would have had, major effects on output and employment, in other 
words to use an older term, if such failures would be, or would have been, non-neutral 
with respect to these variables.  If unremediated failure would have been neutral, it is not 
useful for macroeconomists to call the failures or threatened failures a crisis, even though 
there may be loud and persistent voices arguing the contrary, and even though the failures 
may in fact have been remediated. Many firms face crises which are financial in the sense 
that the firms face insolvency. From a macroeconomic policy perspective, however, the 
term crisis should be reserved for failures or incipient failures that threaten or cause deep 
recessions and slow, drawn out recoveries.  I am thus sympathetic to a definition of 
financial instability offered by Eric Rosengren (2011): “Financial instability occurs when 
problems (or concerns about potential problems) within institutions, markets, payment 
systems, or the financial system in general significantly impair the supply of credit 
intermediation services – so as to substantially impact the path of real economic activity” 
(my italics). The importance of acknowledging directly the link between financial 
disturbances and the possibility of output loss was reflected in the increased post-2007 
emphasis on the desirability of macroprudential regulation.   
In retrospective or historical analysis, the fact of remediation complicates the task 
of identifying which sets of financial disturbances were macroeconomically significant.  
Consider pure cases (remediation either happens or it does not). If disturbances were not 
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remediated, and plausibly caused a subsequent recession and slow recovery with 
significant cumulative output loss, we would know that the disturbances were indeed 
macroeconomically significant. If they were not remediated, and were associated with 
little subsequent damage to the real economy, we would know that they were 
systemically unimportant.  However, if it were possible for remediation to completely 
avoid damage to the real economy resulting from the failure of institutions receiving a 
prior designation of systemically important, we could have a problem.  It would be 
impossible to tell, after the fact, among those disturbances that were remediated, which, 
had they been left unremediated, would have damaged the real economy.  It is the same 
problem faced in assessing the effectiveness of a medical treatment in the absence of 
controlled double blind clinical studies.  
Fortunately for the task at hand, there is broad consensus that fully effective 
remediation of impaired SIFIs is likely to be rare.  Policy makers have generally been 
more proactive in fighting fires than in preventing their outbreak.17  Because of this, 
examining cumulative output loss following candidate financial disturbances is useful in 
considering whether, retrospectively, they should be considered to have been 
macroeconomically significant.   
Determinations of which failures could pose a threat to the macroeconomy cannot 
be made easily in the heat of what might be a crisis.  They must be done ex ante – which 
is why Dodd-Frank represented a step forward, even if the aspiration never to bail out 
again probably reflected wishful thinking.  We should now be equally vigorous in 
                                                 
17 As Reinhardt and Rogoff concluded in 2013: “Lesson 1: On prevention versus crisis management. We 
have done better at the latter than the former. It is doubtful that this will change as memories of the crisis 
fade and financial market participants and their regulators become complacent” (2013, p. 5). 
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purging our historical databases of financial disturbances that did not in fact threaten the 
macroeconomy.  The S&L insolvencies are a case in point.  Had Dodd-Frank been in 
place in the 1980s, the S&Ls would not have been labelled as systemically important.   
5.  The 1982 and 1990/91 Recessions 
With respect to the early 1980s and the early 1990s, either both the 1982 and the 
1990-91 downturns should be treated as recessions triggered by financial crisis (few 
dispute this classification for 2007-09), or neither, or one should be but not the other. In 
assessing macroeconomic significance, one must judge first whether an accompanying 
recession was triggered by financial disturbance and second, what sort of cumulative 
output loss resulted.  This section considers the 1980/82 recessions. 
The downturn in GDP growth and rise in unemployment in the early 1980s are 
widely attributed to the tight money policies adopted by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul 
Volcker to reduce the inflation rate.  Volcker eventually succeeded (with an assist from 
collapsing oil prices), although, contrary to predictions of rational expectations theorists, 
it came at the expense of what was then perceived to be a very substantial loss of output.  
 Using Congressional Budget Office estimates of potential and Bureau of 
Economic Analysis estimates of actual, we can calculate the cumulative output loss 
between 1981Q2 and 1984Q2 at $993 billion 2009 dollars, or about 14.1 percent of 
average potential GDP during that period.18  This can be viewed as the cost of reducing 
inflation from almost 10 percent in the late 1970s to 4 percent and lower in the 1980s and 
thereafter. 
                                                 
18 Quarterly CBO estimates of potential output at 
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#6; actual output at http://www.bea.gov, NIPA 
Table 1.1.6.  Potential output data are from the January 2016 estimates. Accessed March 19, 2016.   
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According to conventional wisdom, especially that reflecting the assumption of 
adaptive expectations, this was a garden variety recession, albeit severe, but one (unlike 
1974-75) easily understood as driven by aggregate demand mechanisms.  Is it possible 
that the conventional wisdom nevertheless missed something?  If the S&L sector was 
already insolvent in 1982, is it possible that the 1982 recession should also be classified 
as one accompanied by financial crisis? Lindgren et al (1996, p. 34) treat the thirteen-year 
period stretching from 1980 to 1992 as marked by “significant” banking problems, 
pointing out that during this period 1,395 banks closed, as well as 1,142 S&Ls.   Their 
classification of banking problems as “significant” indicates a lower degree of severity 
than crisis, although it also suggests considerable continuity across the entire period, 
which makes a difference if we end up classifying the late 1980s and early 1990s as 
crisis.   
Many banks (as well as S&Ls) did indeed close. But most failed banks were small.  
Between 1980 and 1994 the FDIC supervised the shuttering of 1,617 commercial banks. 
Their assets, however, totaled less than 9 percent of total commercial bank assets.19   
As noted, there is still lack of agreement among scholars about exactly what is 
meant by a financial crisis, but consensus in distinguishing within this category among 
banking, sovereign debt, and currency crises.  Since none of the episodes under 
discussion here (the 1982 recession, the S&L meltdown/1990-91 recession, or the 2007-
                                                 
19Failed bank assets as a percentage of FDIC insured commercial and saving banks as of December 31, 
1979, plus assets of subsequently chartered institutions as of date of failure, merger, or December 31, 1994, 
whichever is applicable (FDIC, 1994, p. 156). The exception to the generalization about the size of failed 
institutions was Continental Illinois (1984), then the eighth largest US commercial bank. Continental 
Illinois was, until Washington Mutual went under in 2008, the largest bank failure in U.S. history, and its 
bailout first made commonplace the concept of too big to fail.  It got into trouble with oil related loans in 
Texas and Oklahoma purchased from the failed Penn Square bank.  These loans had not been adequately 
scrutinized by bank officers (kickbacks and fraud were involved), and when sharply declining oil prices 
made it evident that the loans would not be repaid, lenders ran on the bank.  
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2009 recession and slow recovery) was associated with flight either from US government 
debt or the US dollar, we can begin by agreeing that the type of disturbances under 
consideration involved banking (or, more generally, financial institutions).  
One symptom of a banking crisis will be the failure, or delayed failure of financial 
institutions, and on these counts, one could argue that both 1982 and 1986-1995 qualify. 
The preponderance of S&Ls were already “zombie” institutions by the early 1980s.  They 
were kept alive (made to appear solvent and profitable) by regulatory accounting 
gimmicks, and almost half of then failed or otherwise disappeared during the subsequent 
decade.  As noted, commonly accepted criteria for identifying banking crises typically 
emphasize runs on financial institutions, often but not always accompanied by 
government bailouts (Government Accountability Office, 2013, p. 9).  The S&L 
meltdown meets these standards (bailout and runs on state insured banks in Ohio and 
Maryland, and in California at IndyMac), and arguably casts a penumbra over both the 
1982 and 1990-91 recessions.  
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 Source:  Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts (2014, June 5 release), table F-7, lines 11-12. 
But to qualify as an event with macroeconomic significance and justify designation 
as a financial crisis, we need more. Some banking crises (broadly understood) occur in 
institutions that are not systemically important and whose impact is highly localized, and 
they do not engender or threaten a significant downturn in real economic activity. The 
S&L insolvencies fall into this category 
Systemic banking crises are often defined as those in which most or all of the 
banking system’s capital is exhausted (Boyd, Kwak, and Smith, 2005, p. 981).20 This is 
likely to be accompanied, on income statements, by a sharp drop in aggregate financial 
                                                 
20 See also Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, Martinex-Peria and Rose, 2001, p. 55: “For an episode to 
qualify as a banking crisis, we must observe financial distress resulting in the erosion of most or all of 
aggregate banking system capital.” 
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sector corporate profits, both in absolute terms, and in relation to nonfinancial profits.  
Although figure 1 shows 2007-2009 clearly qualifying on this account, neither the 1982 
recession nor the mild 1990-91 recession show much evidence of this.  A very large 
number of S&Ls, of course, did exhaust their capital, and continued to lose large amounts 
of money.  This was not, however, true for the banking sector as a whole. 
2007-2009 now provides a benchmark for what a systemic (and, by my definition, 
macroeconomically significant) financial crisis and its aftermath looks like in the post-
World War II United States.  In particular, this episode evidenced a very large decline in 
pretax corporate profits reported in the financial sector, from a peak of $415.1 billion in 
2006 to $95.4 billion in 2008.  In contrast, financial sector profits declined from $41.8 
billion in 1979 to $27.2 billion in 1982, a slippage of 35 as opposed to 77 percent.   
Moreover, the decline in financial sector profits in 1982 should be understood as 
largely a consequence of a recession that had its sources elsewhere, in the efforts of the 
Federal Reserve System to reduce inflation by slowing the growth rate of the money 
stock.  The resulting negative aggregate demand shock increased nonfinancial business 
bankruptcies, which increased bad loans and understandably took a toll on the profits of 
the financial sector. The causality ran principally from recession (whose origin was to be 
found in the conference room of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)  
to decline in financial sector profits.    
In contrast, it was financial crisis that drove the US economy deep into recession in 
2008. Whereas John Taylor and others have suggested that monetary policy was too loose 
between 2001 and 2004, no one has suggested that the 2007-09 recession was caused by 
tight monetary policy, or that it was a recession originating outside of the financial sector 
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that produced distress within it.21  In this fundamental respect 1982 and 2007-09 were 
very different. 
As far as the period of the S&L meltdown itself (during which losses were finally 
recognized, and the institutions were allowed or forced to merge or fail), between 1986 
and 1995 financial sector profits increased, with the exception of a slight decline (under 
10 percent) between 1992 and 1993.  If we treat financial sector profits as a barometer 
indicating aggregate stress on the financial system, the S&L “crisis”, in contrast with 
2007-08, hardly registers (figure 1). 
Another way to consider the significance of financial disturbances is to look at the 
share of financial sector corporate profits in total pretax domestic corporate profits.  Once 
again, there is no doubt about the sizable footprint of the more recent set of events:  after 
peaking at 43 percent in 2002, that share fell to 10 percent in 2008.  The general trend in 
that ratio has been upward since 1975, and we do see a gradual decline from 34 percent in 
1992 to 24 percent in 1994, but it is not nearly as large proportionally (figure 2). 
                                                 
21 However, as the downturn began the Congressional Budget Office did note the negative yield spread at 
the end of 2007 (inverted term structure of interest rates) and indicated that this condition had incorrectly 
predicted a recession “only once since 1955” (2008, p. 30). 
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Source:  Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts (2014, June 5 release), table F-7, lines 11-12. 
A related measure of the impact of a recession triggered by financial crisis is the 
effect on private sector bond prices and yields. In a garden variety recession (one not 
associated with financial crisis), yields will generally fall and prices will strengthen, with 
the exception of very risky bonds. In contrast, as we know from 2008, in a recession 
triggered by a macroeconomically significant financial crisis, prices of virtually all 
private sector debt plummets, as a flight to quality drives Treasury yields down and all 
other yields up. There is little evidence of this either in 1990-91 or for that matter in 
1982. 
One of the signature features of the 2007-09 episode was a dramatic spike in the 
TED spread, in which the gap between the short term Treasury bill rate and the rate at 
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which banks were willing to lend Eurodollars to each other soared to over 300 basis 
points.  Is there evidence of stress in this measure associated with the S&L troubles?  The 
FRED database has information on the TED spread (TEDRATE) going back to 1984, and 
if one takes a quick look at the chart, it appears that there might be, since one sees a big 
spike to 300 basis points in late 1987.  Indeed, this was the record prior to 2007-09. This 
earlier spike, however, was entirely related to the 1987 stock market crash, which 
featured the largest (22.6 percent) one-day percentage decline in stock market history 
(October 19, 1987).  The TED spread reached 292 basis points on that day and then 
peaked on Tuesday October 20, 1987 at 302 basis points before subsiding.  There are no 
suggestions that the S&L insolvencies – threatened or actual – had anything to do with 
the stock market crash, and therefore with this spike in the TED spread.  
The 1990-91 recession was relatively mild, associated in part with the temporary 
spike in oil prices accompanying the first Gulf War.  By 1992, TED spreads were at some 
of their lowest rates in the last thirty years.    In the shadow of 2008, and with knowledge 
of the course of the economy in the 1990s, the claim that the S&L insolvencies were 
macroeconomically significant is problematic, both because at the aggregate level the 
recession was mild, and because there is little evidence linking it to the S&L travails. 
And the suggestion that 1982 should be considered a recession triggered by a (disguised) 
financial crisis seems, in the light of the data, to be something of a reach for those who 
wished, in highlighting the contrast between the sharp economic recovery from 1982 and 
the sluggish recovery from 2007-09, to place the Obama administration’s recovery record 
in a more unfavorable light.   
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      According to the criterion advanced in this paper, for a financial crisis to be 
macroeconomically significant, it is sufficient for it to be followed by an economic 
downturn and slow recovery generating a substantial cumulative output loss, and for 
there to be a strong case that the crisis not only accompanied the recession but also 
caused it.  Both the 1982 and the 2007-09 recessions saw sharp downturns.22 But while 
there is good reason to believe that the latter recession was triggered by financial crisis, 
there is little evidence to suggest that this was true in the case of the former.23   
Calculating the cost of a financial crisis requires both a plausible case linking a 
recession and slow recovery to the financial disturbances and  an estimate of the 
cumulative output loss.  Other suggested markers, such as the rise in unemployment or 
the unemployment rate (Better Markets, 2012) represent in a sense double counting: in 
these cases, we are simply observing correlates of the rising output gap.  Given the NIPA 
accounting identities, the lost income of those no longer at work (as well as their lost 
expenditure) is equal to the value of lost output.   
 
                                                 
22 I include less discussion of the output losses associated with the 2001 recession and subsequent slow 
recovery, because there are no claims that the collapse of the NASDAQ produced a financial crisis.  High 
margin requirements for stock purchases meant that losses by and large stopped at the households holding 
the equities.  There is no evidence in the financial sector profit data that the fall in stock prices jeopardized 
financial institutions in the aggregate. 
23 Reinhart and Rogoff observe that some financial crises are triggered by an economic downturn leading to 
defaults of nonfinancial firms which adversely affect financial institution balance sheets (2009, pp. 145-
46). They use these words to distinguish such cases:  “rather than being the trigger of a recession”.  There is 
little reason to doubt, however, that in 2007-09, in contrast with 1982, financial distress was the trigger of 
recession (not vice versa) and almost all contemporaneous commentary reflected this view.  The 2011 
Congressional Budget Office Budget and Economic Outlook report summarized developments in this way: 
“The economy has struggled to recover from the current recession, which was triggered by a decline in 
house prices and a financial crisis -- events unlike anything this country has seen since the Great 
Depression” (highlights, p. 28). Or, as Hall put it, “…I take for granted that the financial crisis was the 
cause of the collapse in product and labor demand and that expansionary policy was unable to offset the 
collapse” (2014, p. 2).  In their study of financial and currency crises, Bordo et al (2001, p. 64) reject the 
idea that crises are mere ephemera, reflections of macroeconomic cycles that have their origin and laws of 
motion elsewhere. 
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6.  Preoccupation with the Cost of Remediation and the Impact on the Treasury 
Much attention has focused on estimates of the cost of remediation associated with 
the S&L insolvencies as well as the distress facing much larger institutions in 2007-09 
(there is little discussion of such costs for 1982, when bank failures were easily handled 
by the FDIC). Debating the size of taxpayer funded remediation, is likely, however, to 
tell us little about the true costs of a financial crisis for an economy.24 What is more 
important is whether financial distress plausibly caused or heavily influenced a 
subsequent economic downturn and slow recovery, and if so, what was the cumulative 
output loss associated with this deviation from the trajectory of potential output.  
Remediation involves transfers from some groups or individuals to others. 
Focusing on costs to “the average taxpayer” obscures the benefits many receive.  S&L 
remediation was associated with transfers to creditors of failed institutions as well as to 
institutions that took over the assets and liabilities of those that had failed (which had 
much the same effect).  To the degree that some of the remediation represented the 
disbursement of insurance premia previously remitted by S&L institutions, there was no 
additional burden on taxpayers, although of course the insolvency and ultimate demise of 
the FSLIC in 1989 reflected the fact that these funds were hardly sufficient to make good 
on the guarantees.   
The preferred approach to considering cost has been to total up federal 
disbursements, sometimes excluding and sometimes including payments from 
government operated but industry financed insurance pools such as FSLIC or FDIC. For 
                                                 
24 Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009, p. 404) note that “the traditional emphasis on fiscal cost of bank cleanup is 




the S&L insolvencies estimates of the totals (including interest on debt over a 30 to 40 
year horizon) have come in as high as half a trillion early 1990s dollars (White, 1997, p. 
197).  1994 GDP was approximately $7 trillion so by that measure the bailout cost about 
7 percent of one year’s GDP. 
There is a strong argument, however, that the cost of remediation should be 
reckoned independently of how it is financed, and it is therefore not appropriate to 
include interest on borrowed money in these tabulations.25 When the government costs 
out a major weapons system, it doesn’t include interest charges assuming the money used 
to acquire the weapons is borrowed (Curry and Shibut, 2000, p. 29). If one just looks at 
direct costs (assuming, say, that the transfers were financed with taxes), we are closer to 3 
percent. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) provide 3.2 percent of one year’s GDP as an 
estimate of the resolution costs of the 8-year episode they see running from 1984 through 
1991.  Lindgren et al (1996) come up with 2.4 percent for the thirteen-year period 1980-
92 they identified as associated with “significant” banking problems.  Frydl (1999) treats 
these as upper and lower bounds of the costs of resolution. 
In 2007-09, remediation was more multifaceted.  It included traditional FDIC 
resolutions, the largest of which was of Washington Mutual, and these were similar in 
mechanism and effect to what had transpired in the S&L cases.  But for larger financial 
institutions, deemed too big or too interconnected to fail, remediation consisted of 
                                                 
25 The decision as to whether costs are financed by borrowing or a current levy on taxpayers is in principle 
separate.  If I buy a television for $1,000, that’s what it costs me.  It doesn’t make sense to increase that 
amount by what I could have earned if I’d invested those funds, or what it would have cost in total had the 
purchase been financed.  In a world without frictions, $1,000 is the present value of the stream of earnings I 
could get if I lent out the money.  It is also the present value of the principal and interest payments owed if 
the money were borrowed. The S&L bailout did of course have political consequences.  The cost of the 
transfers associated with remediation was part of what led President George H. W. Bush to agree to tax 
increases, behavior that may have cost him reelection. 
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government (Treasury) injections of equity (the Capital Purchase Program portion of 
TARP), which were funded by tax revenues or borrowing. TARP funds were also used to 
acquire equity positions in the insurance company AIG as well as major automobile 
companies, with the exception of Ford. In a separate operation, the Treasury took Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. 
Remediation can also be thought of as including various Federal Reserve liquidity 
facilities that helped banks and other financial institutions (many of which were by any 
reasonable measure insolvent as well as illiquid) meet current demands for cash, 
affirmative action by the Fed to acquire mortgage backed securities (a major factor after 
2009 in extending the Fed’s balance sheet), the payment of interest on deposits by 
member institutions at the Fed,  which by 2014 was transferring approximately $6.5 
billion annually of additional revenue to banks,26 the temporary extension of deposit 
insurance to money market funds, support of the commercial paper market, and other 
guarantees.27  Some writers include countercyclical fiscal policy, such as the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) as another dimension of remediation: by 
mitigating the depth of the recession it helped the asset side of financial institutions’ 
balance sheets to recover. 
Remediation targeted directly at financial institutions operated on both sides of 
balance sheets (the Fed generally on the left hand (assets) side, the Treasury on the right 
                                                 
26 On February 28, 2014, member banks held approximately $2.6 trillion of deposits at the Fed.  The $650 
billion estimate is based on this amount and an interest rate of 25 basis points.  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/quarterly_balance_sheet_developments_report_20140
3.pdf, accessed June 17, 2014. 
27 Payment of interest on reserves represents an indirect charge on the Treasury, since it reduces the 
operating revenues the Fed can return to the Treasury at the end of the year.  To the degree that the Fed 
purchased mortgage backed securities that failed to perform, that would also lead to an indirect charge on 
the Treasury, for a similar reason.   
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(liabilities/net worth).  These efforts partially insulated the US (and to a lesser degree the 
world) financial system from what might otherwise have been a much greater cumulative 
output loss.  From a macroeconomic perspective, however, it is of little consequence 
whether the remediation programs ended up costing the Treasury money. 
It is in fact likely that none of them will.  The question of whether the TARP 
program would ultimately turn a profit remained for a time contentious, with the Treasury 
taking a highly optimistic view and the Office of the Special Inspector General for the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program taking a much more pessimistic and critical view 
(SIGTARP, 2013).  By January 31, 2014 the Capital Purchase Program portion of TARP 
had returned $225 billion to the Treasury in repayments, dividends, interest, and warrant 
income, compared with disbursements of $205 billion in equity injections to financial 
institutions in 2008 (GAO, 2014). The TARP program overall included the Capital 
Purchase Program for financial institutions as well as the Treasury’s portion of the AIG 
rescue (the New York Fed also participated), and the positions taken in automobile 
companies. By April 30, 2014, beneficiaries had returned $438.5 billion to the Treasury, 
exceeding the total disbursements of $423.7 billion28 (US. Department of the Treasury, 
2014). 
The other big Treasury operation was the conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie.  
The 2008 equity injections required outflows from the Treasury of $189 billion. An 
October 2012 Wall Street Journal story suggested that the actual taxpayer cost would be 
about $78 billion, down from earlier administration estimates of $130 billion.  By March 
                                                 
28 TARP was originally authorized for $700 billion, but this was reduced to $475 billion by the Dodd Frank 
bill.  The large banks’ and AIG’s ability to pay back equity infusions was due in part to the Fed’s massive 
purchases of mortgage backed securities, and the Treasury’s conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie. Both 
types of actions strengthened banking sector balance sheets independently of TARP. 
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of 2014, returns to the Treasury from the two GSEs exceeded disbursements of $189 
billion by $15 billion.  
But do the apparent profits on the two major Treasury operations indicate that the 
financial crisis didn’t actually cost the government (or the economy) anything?  Of 
course not. First of all, on the narrower question, although the TARP bailouts have been 
repaid, taxpayers were not compensated for the very large ex ante downside risk they 
bore. Moreover, TARP expenditures were a fraction of the costs to the Treasury (and the 
states) of the financial crisis, since the ensuing recession and slow recovery meant a loss 
of tax revenue that would otherwise have been collected.  Total receipts at all levels of 
government fell from $4.2 trillion in 2007 to $3.7 trillion in 2009. Total current receipts 
for the Federal government declined from $2.66 trillion to $2.23 trillion between these 
two years.    
The S&L remediation “cost” the economy roughly 3 percent of GDP (remember, 
these were transfers, and many individuals, often high net worth, benefitted) while the 
response to the 2008 crisis may ultimately make money for the Treasury.  Those 
outcomes, however, have almost no bearing on which of the two sets of financial 
disturbances was more macroeconomically significant. 
Here are the important facts: the first financial crisis of the twenty first century 
caused a recession and slow recovery that resulted (and continues to result) in a very 
large cumulative output loss.29  In contrast, the S&L insolvencies had almost no 
connection to the subsequent recession and slow recovery which, in any event, resulted in 
a modest cumulative output loss. 
                                                 
29NIPA tables 3.1 and 3.2, accessed June 13, 2014. 
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7.  Cumulative Output Loss: 1990-98 
The US economy did experience a recession in 1990-91, part of which might be 
attributed to the decline in construction spending, particularly in Texas and California.  
But the declines in aggregate magnitudes were relatively small.  Residential construction 
dropped from $239.5 billion in 1989 to $205.1 billion in 1991 before recovering.  
Housing starts dipped from a peak of 1.6 million in January of 1989 (all numbers are at 
an annualized rate) to a trough of 798 thousand in January of 1991, but quickly recovered 
to over 1 million, as they had in the 1982 recession (Congressional Budget Office, 2008, 
p. 34).  In contrast, starts collapsed from a peak of over 2.2 million in January of 2006 to 
a trough of 478 thousand in April of 2009, considerably below where they had been at the 
depths of either the 1982 or 1990-91 recessions.  Recovery of housing starts after 2009 
took a very long time. Starts averaged just over 900 thousand in the first 8 months of 
2013, and in April of 2014, they were barely over 1 million on an annualized basis.  In 
August of 2015, at just over 1.1 million, they were still barely half their peak more than 
eight years earlier (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2, series HOUST, accessed March 
23, 2016).  In September they broke 1.2 million, but remained somewhat below that 
through February of 2016. 
 Perhaps we should focus on nonresidential construction.  But here the percentage 
decline in the 1990-91 recession was even smaller. Nonresidential construction for the 
country as a whole dropped from $622.4 billion in 1990 to $598.2 billion in 1991 before 
recovering (all magnitudes nominal, from NIPA table 1.1.5). The Federal Reserve 
Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending showed a modest decline 
during the 1990-91 recession, comparable to what was seen in 2001, but overshadowed 
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by the precipitous fall in 2008 (Congressional Budget Office, 2009, p. 10).  There is little 
evidence of deterioration in this measure during the 1982 recession, (although a large 
negative spike in 1980 associated with the imposition of credit controls).  
There are multiple channels whereby financial failures may adversely affect the 
real economy.  The most potentially devastating is through the credit channel.  If failures 
threaten or cause to seize up flows of lending, as was the case with the failure of Lehman 
Brothers, the damage to capital formation and to the real economy can be very serious 
indeed.  The data at the national level on construction spending– the component of gross 
private domestic investment we would most expect to be affected by S&L failures, do not 
suggest such an impact. 
          Congressional Budget Office data (2011, p. 28) show output roughly at potential 
between 1985 and 1990, then dropping below potential between 1990Q4 and 1998Q2.  
Real GDP fell a slight .2 percent between 1990 and 1991, probably influenced by the 
direct effect of the rise in oil prices associated with the first Persian Gulf War, and the 
indirect effects on spending due to related drops in consumer and business confidence.  
Output recovered relatively rapidly in 1992, although a diminishing output gap remained 
until mid-1998.  In absolute terms the loss is reflected in the rise of the unemployment 
rate from 5 percent in March of 1989 to 7.8 percent in June of 1992.  A 2.8 percentage 
point increase is not trivial, although it pales in comparison with the increase from 4.5 
percent in March of 2007 to 10 percent in October of 2009 or from 2.9 percent in 1929 to 
24.9 percent in 1933.  Moreover, after its June 1992 peak, the unemployment rate 
dropped almost as quickly as it had risen, and then continued to decline in the 1990s, 
reaching a nadir of 3.8 percent in April of 2000.   
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Sources:  Quarterly CBO estimates of potential output available at 
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#6; actual output at http://www.bea.gov, NIPA 
Table 1.1.6.  Accessed March 23, 2016. 
 
       The cumulative output loss between 1990Q4 and 1998Q2 played a role in the 1992 
Presidential election,30 but was nevertheless small compared to what has and will be 
experienced in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  It is important in 
estimating the macroeconomic cost of a downturn not to limit oneself to the periods of 
recession identified by the NBER business cycle dating committee.  The economy can 
return to growth and thus be characterized as having emerged from its downturn, but in 
levels remain substantially below the prior trajectory of potential.  
The NBER determined that the economy was in recession for 8 months from the 
third quarter of 1990 through the first quarter of 1991, but we must consider as well the 
                                                 
30 In the memorable words of James Carville’s advice to Bill Clinton on winning the 1992 election, “It’s the 
economy, stupid.” 
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recovery period during which the economy remained below potential. The calculations 
that follow reference the period from 1990Q4 through 1998Q2, when the economy 
returned to potential.  I compare the CBO’s series for real potential output in chained 
2009 dollars with actual output using the same metric, and cumulate the output gaps. This 
comes to $1.4 trillion, which can be compared with average potential output during this 
period of $10.246 trillion.  We can therefore say that this period of below potential output 
at the start of the 1990s cost approximately 13.8 percent of one year’s GDP. 
From the perspective of the questions posed in this paper, however, the size of this 
number is almost beside the point, because there is at best a tenuous connection between 
the output shortfall between 1990 and 1998 and the S&L troubles.  In a 1992 discussion, 
Stephen McNees hardly mentioned the S&L sector in discussing the genesis of the 
downturn.  Robert Hall (1993) echoing Olivier Blanchard (1993), concluded that the 
downturn had something to do with the response of consumer and business confidence to 
the Iraq war and the spike in oil prices. There is no mention at all of the S&L difficulties 
in his list of eight possible causes of the recession. Carl Walsh (1993) argued that if there 
was a cause it was restrictive monetary policy.  David Geltner (2013) concluded that 
commercial real estate, which was differentially implicated in fraudulent S&L lending, 
did not play a major role in causing the recession or influencing recovery in the early 
1990s.31 The main contrary view I could find is in an article on http://about.com by 
Kimberly Amadeo entitled “The History of Recessions in the United States.”  Regarding 
the 1990-91 recession she wrote that “It was caused by the Savings and Loan Crisis in 
1989”, full stop. Her statement reflected a popular view, presumably derived from the 
                                                 
31 “CRE (commercial real estate) was much more intertwined with the S&L crisis than it was with the 
1990-91 recession…” (Geltner, 2013, p. 1). 
 44 
observation that the recession and slow recovery followed the bulk of the S&L 
insolvencies, but one not shared by most although not all academic economists.  Ng and 
Wright (2013, p. 1129), recently claimed that the 1990-91 recession “was caused by the 
savings-and-loan crisis”, although they provide no analysis, explanation, or evidence to 
back this up. 
The fact that virtually everyone in the early 1990s, including academic, 
government, and business economists, thought the S&L insolvencies were a debacle and 
a crisis, yet very few32 found a connection to the subsequent recession and output gap 
brings into sharp focus the questions raised in this paper about the criteria used in 
designating a series of events a financial crisis. Can we consider financial disturbances a 
crisis if they have virtually no impact on the real economy?   
If we can link financial disturbance to a recession and slow recovery resulting in 
significant cumulative output loss we have established sufficient conditions for 
macroeconomic significance.  Conversely, demonstrating that failures were not followed 
by these outcomes provides necessary though not sufficient grounds for concluding that 
the disturbances had little macroeconomic significance.  The evidence is only necessary 
because there is still the possibility that the character, amount, and/or timing of 
remediation prevented output loss that otherwise would have occurred.  
 Determining whether the output trajectory might have been sensitive to the nature 
of remediation represents essentially the same challenge as determining whether the 
                                                 
32 Akerlof and Shiller (2009, p. 30) do consider the S&L crisis a factor, but say that “the loss in confidence 
in the wake of the first Iraq war and the spike in oil prices that preceded it were more important.”  
Elsewhere (p. 86) they state that “the failures did not have a major macroeconomic effect.”  King (1994) 
attributed the recession of the early 1990s in the US, UK and other countries to excessive credit expansion 
in the 1980s, particularly among mortgaged homeowners.  Their attempt to deleverage in the 1990s 
explains the sharp decline in consumption, a notable feature of the slump in the US between 1929 and 
1933.  In this story the S&Ls do play a role, since they helped fuel the credit expansion. 
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impaired institutions were systemically important.  As noted, the Dodd- Frank act 
requires ex ante identification of SIFIs (systemically important financial institutions).   
The act mandates, in advance, tagging those institutions whose failure would have 
significant negative consequences for the macroeconomy.  
Whether a financial institution is systemically important depends on how large is 
its asset base, how enmeshed it is in chains of intermediation (a function of its degree of 
leverage and the nature of its liabilities), and how available are substitute intermediation 
services. The potential for contagion is important, and there are several mechanisms 
whereby it can occur. The simplest is direct interconnection.  If A fails, and has borrowed 
from B, so that A’s liabilities are B’s assets, then B may be in jeopardy.  And if B fails, 
and has borrowed from C, C can be vulnerable.  Like a row of falling dominoes, the 
failure of one institution might generate a cascade of other failures. 
Contagion can also occur in the absence of direct interconnection. If A fails, 
holders of B’s short term liabilities might run, not necessarily because B actually holds 
A’s liabilities, but due to lack of knowledge of “where the bodies are buried”: fears that 
B’s asset portfolio is similar to A’s and/or that apparently similar deposit guarantees are 
wobbly.33   B’s solvency might also be threatened if, with an asset profile similar to A’s, 
fire sales of A’s assets drive down the market value of B’s assets. 
 Widespread collapse of financial institutions can damage the real economy 
through multiple channels. New and existing businesses dependent on external finance 
and lacking direct access to capital markets may find themselves deprived of credit.  
Some, with viable plans for business expansion, will not be able to undertake them.  
                                                 
33 White (2014) distinguishes between cascades (the interconnection mechanism) and contagion; both types 
of links are often considered to be part of financial contagion. 
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Others, relying on credit for ongoing operations, may not be able to make payroll or 
purchase materials, and industries whose customers depend on credit may not be able to 
purchase goods or services.  Firms normally accessing external finance by issuing 
commercial paper or corporate bonds may find these markets chaotic, and accessible only 
on penalty terms if at all. Consumption and gross private domestic investment will be 
lower, aggregate demand will suffer, output and employment will fall, and more business 
failures may ensue, further weakening financial institution balance sheets.   Declining 
profits and weakened earnings constrain firms that otherwise might finance expansion 
internally; even where funds are available new projects may now appear unattractive in 
the context of a deepening recession. 
Failures may also generate negative wealth effects.  When financial institutions 
fail, depositors, bondholders, and shareholders may all find themselves poorer, and this 
may adversely affect consumption. In the case of the S&Ls, even had there been no 
remediation, such wealth effects would have been small. It cost about $200 billion, or 
roughly 3 percent of GDP, to resolve the insolvencies.  This seems like a considerable 
sum, and it was, but it should be kept in perspective.34 The dot.com collapse a decade 
later resulted in a $7 trillion decline in household wealth, an order of magnitude higher in 
both absolute terms and as a share of GDP than the losses associated with the S&L 
failures.35  Job gains between 2001 and 2006 were soft, but the collapse of the NASDAQ 
                                                 
34 At the time US private depositary institutions held almost $4.7 trillion in assets, and pension funds 
approximately as much again.  Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data, Tables L.109 and L.116.  Release of 
September 18, 2014. 
35 GDP was $10.6 trillion in 2001, so we are talking about a decline in stock market wealth equal to about 
70 percent of GDP, as opposed to the roughly 3 percent of GDP associated with the S&L remediation. 
Because of 50 percent margin requirements on new stock purchases, a rule in place since 1974, the impact 
of stock market declines generally stopped with the households that held the stock.  The risk to financial 
institutions lending on stock is small, except in the unusual event of a catastrophically rapid decline in 
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does not appear to have had a major macroeconomic impact, in part because the 
burgeoning housing construction boom took up some of the slack in the economy, but 
more importantly because the intermediation chain was short, and losses stopped quickly 
with households owning the assets. 
The more leveraged is an institution, and the more contagion threatens, the more 
vulnerable may be the larger financial system and the macroeconomy to possible failure, 
and the more sensitive may be the real economy to the character, timing and amount of 
remediation.  On the other hand, if the asset base is limited and/or losses will stop with 
the first round of liability holders, and if comparable intermediation services will be 
available from still solvent institutions, the possible or actual macroeconomic impact of 
failure will be much less sensitive to the nature, timing and amount of remediation. 
Although, like most financial institutions, S&Ls were highly levered, their 
liabilities consisted principally of retail and brokered deposits, the latter collected from 
high net worth individuals by intermediaries such as Merrill Lynch and then funneled to 
S&Ls willing to pay the highest rates.  These flows were supplemented by union pension 
funds, particularly through corrupt organizations such as Mario Renda’s First United 
Fund.  Broker-dealers were not, however, lending to savings and loans on their own 
account, nor, by and large, were S&Ls borrowing from banks. Finally, the S&Ls were not 
providing unique or irreplaceable intermediation services.  Some of the biggest problems 
involved commercial lending, an arena in which S&Ls were novices, and by all accounts, 
doing a very bad job of underwriting.  
                                                                                                                                                 
prices, where there is not enough time to sell out before margin is exhausted.  There were likely modest 
negative impacts on consumption in the early 2000s, but partly because stock is more unequally held than 
real estate, the consumption hit was lower than when the subsequent real estate bubble burst (because high 
income and high net worth individuals have lower marginal propensities to consume). 
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Due to the relatively small size of the insolvent institutions, the lack of 
interconnectedness reflected in their liabilities, and the availability of other institutions 
capable of lending on real estate, we can state with some confidence that the failed S&Ls 
were not systemically important. The fact that individually owned insured deposits 
formed the overwhelming preponderance of the liability structure – often cited as a 
necessary condition for the “debacle” – guaranteed a very short chain of intermediation 
and made the institutions systemically unimportant.  One can state the hypothesis more 
broadly: no institution funded entirely by equity and insured deposits provided by 
individuals is likely to be systemically important.  Even had their depositors not been 
made whole, the macroeconomic damage would probably have been limited, because the 
losses would have stopped after only one or at most two links in a chain of 
intermediation.36  
The FSLIC, unlike the FDIC, did not legally have the full faith and credit of the 
United States government standing behind it.  Had backstopping not ultimately been 
provided in 1989 when the FSLIC ran out of money, losses would have been absorbed by 
the households that owned deposits of failed institutions and would have stopped there.  
Thus contagion through directly interconnected balance sheets would have been limited.  
Contagion to solvent institutions through other mechanisms could have been prevented 
by providing liquidity to S&Ls deemed merely illiquid and contagion to banks forestalled 
                                                 
36 For a contrary view, see Adams (1990, p 53): “(Danny) Wall had scrambled under a threat not 
known since the Depression: the possibility of widespread bank runs and a general panic.”   But 
failures of S&Ls did not threaten contagion, because losses stopped directly at households – retail 
depositors and holders of brokered deposits.  If Lehman Brothers had been funded either by equity 
(capital) or by brokered certificates of deposit provided by individual households, its failure would 
have posed much less threat to the financial system and real economy.  It was reliance on 
collateralized borrowing from other financial institutions using the repo mechanism that created a 
dangerous network of interconnections and made the investment bank systemically important. 
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by making clear that (unlike the FSLIC) the FDIC guarantee stood even if its fund were 
exhausted.    
I am not saying this necessarily would have been good policy, or fair.  But 
exploring the consequences of a scenario in which depositors were not made whole 
reinforces the conclusion that the absence of significant cumulative output loss is mostly 
attributable to the systemic unimportance of the failed thrifts as opposed to the amount or 
character of remediation.   
8.  Cumulative Output Loss:  2007-26 (and beyond) 
         For 2007-2026, there is a much stronger case that the recession and slow recovery 
was caused by developments in the financial sector.37  By “cause” I do not necessarily 
mean a specific “trigger” such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but rather an accretion 
of financial fragility over a number of years, the result of risky and highly leveraged bets 
made with other people’s money.  Financial fragility increased over time as these features 
come to characterize the balance sheets of both depository institutions and the larger 
penumbra of the shadow financial system.38  This fragility created a predisposing 
vulnerability.  The financial system – mostly actors in the private sector – collectively 
created this vulnerability, through balance sheet decisions within their own institutions, 
and through the use of lobbyists and trade associations to influence legislative and 
regulatory actions.  If the financial sector had been less vulnerable in the second half of 
                                                 
37 The use of 2026 as an endpoint in estimating the macroeconomic repercussions of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis is arbitrary: it simply reflects the outer boundary of the Congressional Budget Office’s ten 
year forecast of actual and potential output in their January 2016 report. In 2026, according to the CBO’s 
forecast of actual output, the economy will still be substantially below a trajectory of potential based on the 
2008 forecast.  
38 I prefer the term shadow financial to shadow banking system, because most of the institutions within it 
were not banks and generally not depository institutions.  See Roubini (2008). Households investing in 
housing had, of course, also become much more highly leveraged. 
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the 2000s, a change in the trajectory of house prices might otherwise have been more 
easily shaken off.  
This state of fragility, particularly as it was hidden in the nether reaches of the 
shadow system, only imperfectly fathomed by policy makers such as Ben Bernanke (he 
admitted as much on several occasions), was by and large unrecognized prior to the 
financial crisis in 2008 but hugely important in understanding and explaining the 2007-
2009 recession and subsequent slow recovery.  In contrast, it was largely absent and 
noncontributory in earlier recessions such as 1982 and 1990-91. 
        The almost complete lack of anticipation of the coming economic downturn can be 
appreciated by reexamining the forecast included in the Congressional Budget Office’s 
The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 to 2018, released in January of 
2008.  This affected the 2008 projection of potential output.  The CBO did note the 
warning signs reflected in rising unemployment claims and the negative yield spread (p. 
33), but did “not expect the slowdown in economic growth to be large enough to register 
as a recession” (2008, p. 21). They acknowledged that 2008 growth could be weaker than 
forecast if “the turmoil in financial markets leads to a more severe economy-wide 
curtailment of lending than CBO anticipates”, but that it could be stronger than forecast if 
“financial institutions (are) able to absorb mortgage related losses without triggering 
significant repercussions in the broader economy.”  
The report went on to say that losses associated with subprime mortgages were 
uncertain, but “expectations are that the banking system as a whole will not be 
imperiled…the tightening of credit standards to date has been less extreme than the 
tightening that occurred during the banking crisis of the early 1990s” (2008, p. 28). The 
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evidence for this appears to have been that at the point the report was written the 
reduction in lending still seemed modest relative to the mild reduction in commercial and 
industrial loans evident in the early 1990s (as well as the early 2000s).  The report 
estimated that the fall in residential construction had shaved about a percentage point 
from GDP growth in 2007, but forecast that falling house prices, by increasing 
affordability, would lead to a reduction of house inventories, producing a revival of 
housing starts in 2009 (p. 31).  The risk of a collapse of business fixed investment 
(nonresidential construction and equipment and software), such as had characterized the 
previous two recessions, was “small” (p. 37).  
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2008, 2016. 
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#6; actual output at http://www.bea.gov, NIPA 
Table 1.1.6.  Accessed March 23, 2016. 
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Subsequent to the publication of its 2008 report, and in the face of recession and 
slow recovery,  the CBO repeatedly reduced its estimates of the trajectory of potential 
output.39 A number of plausible mechanisms justify attributing these downward revisions 
to the effects of the recession and slow recovery. These include reduced labor market 
attachment and the atrophying skills of the long term unemployed as well as physical 
capital accumulation that didn't take place but otherwise might have.40  There is a 
problem, however, in using these revised trajectories to compute cumulative output loss.  
The correct counterfactual is to compare actual output with what potential would have 
been in the absence of the downturn.   
If we grow potential output at rates forecast or projected in the 2008 report (2.7 
percent per year for 2008-13, and 2.5 percent per year for 2014-18, then continuing at 
that rate until the end of the window of the 2016 projection (2026Q4), and compare this 
trajectory with actual through 2015 and then projections of actual through 2026Q4, the 
cumulative output loss at that point will be $41.7 trillion in 2009 dollars, which translates 
to 2.15 years of average potential over the entire 2008Q1-2026Q4 period.    
And we will still be well short of a projection of potential based on the 2008 report. 
The 2008 CBO projection of potential growth was not unreasonably high.  In fact it was 
quite moderate relative to the long run growth rate of the US economy, which had 
averaged a remarkably stable 3.1 percent since the end of the Civil War.  The 2.7 percent 
and 2.5 percent rates reflected in the 2008 forecast were therefore significantly lower than 
historical trend. This was due almost entirely to demographic forecasts of slower growth 
                                                 
39 It also revised downward its forecasts of actual output. 
40 In contrast, there was no downward revision of the estimated potential output trajectory as the result of 
the mild 1990-91 recession. 
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in (potential) labor force and hours (about half a percent a year rather than the long run 
trend of 1 percent per year).  The 2008 estimate of long run total factor productivity 
growth in the private nonfarm economy was what at the time seemed moderate: 1.4 
percent per year.  Combined with an estimated long run growth rate of capital services of 
3.5 percent a year, this yielded a forecast of long run labor productivity growth of about 
2.1 percent a year, roughly consistent with the long run historical average. 
Between the 2008 and 2016 report, the CBO projections of the long run rate of 
growth of the potential labor force growth and potential hours in the nonfarm business 
sector changed hardly at all. But the projection of long run TFP growth declined to 1.3 
percent and then in the January 2014 report to 1.2 percent per year.  The CBO also 
dropped its projection of the long run growth of physical capital services in the private 
nonfarm economy from 3.5 percent in the 2008 report to 3.2 percent per year in the 2014 
report. 41  
 The lowered forecast of TFP and capital services growth knocked a half a 
percentage point off the labor productivity growth rate and therefore the projected growth 
of potential output (arithmetically the sum of the growth of hours and the growth of 
output per hour). In 2014 the CBO also decided that the economy, rather than reattaining 
its (lowered) trajectory of potential in 2017Q1 and remaining at potential thereafter, 
would remain half a percent below potential for the duration of the projection window 
(through 2024Q4). 
                                                 
41 It makes little sense to attribute slow growth of private sector capital services to government budget 
deficits when the economy had considerable excess capacity and was at the zero lower bound.  The slowed 
growth of physical capital services was due to a prolonged period of insufficient aggregate demand, which 
decreased the incentives for new investments in plant and equipment. 
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       If we view the decline in TFP and the decline in capital services growth as entirely 
the consequence of the financial crisis, recession and slow recovery, the estimated 
cumulative loss between 2008Q1 and 2026Q4 of 2.15 years of average potential output 
would still underestimate the total loss, because we will still in 2026Q4 be $3.6 trillion 
(2009 $) below a forecast of potential based on the 2008 CBO report.  However we 
ultimately partition the causes of the downward bending of the projected trajectory of 
potential output subsequent to 2007, assuming it has occurred, we are, in terms of the 
cumulated loss attributable to the financial crisis, recession, and slow recovery, likely to 
be in Great Depression territory.42 A back of the envelope calculation employing Okun’s 
law suggests that cumulative output loss over the twelve year period 1929-41 approached 
three years of average potential over the period. Assume 5 percent was the 
nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (this may be too high, since 
unemployment in 1929 was below 4 percent with little sign of accelerating or for that 
matter even positive inflation).  For each year between 1930 and 1941 inclusive, we can 
calculate the number of percentage points by which the unemployment rate (Lebergott 
series) exceeded 5 percent and multiply by two.  That’s a crude Okun’s law estimate of 
the amount by which actual output fell short of potential in that year.  Cumulate these 
shortfalls and one is at 298 percent. This probably overestimates cumulative loss as a 
                                                 
42 The downturn between 1929 and 1933 was of course much steeper, in part because of differences in 
policy responses, although recovery between 1933 and 1937 and particularly after 1941 was very sharp.  
Still, the cumulated output loss measured as a fraction of average potential GDP associated with the great 
recession and slow recovery is of the same order of magnitude as and rivals that associated with the Great 
Depression (considered as running from 1929 through 1941). As Hall (2014) states, “The years since 2007 
have been a macroeconomic disaster for the United States of a magnitude unprecedented since the Great 
Depression.” For a cross national perspective on the possible post-2007 operation of hysteresis, see Ball 
(2014). 
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fraction of average potential because potential was rising rapidly and the most severe 
shortfalls were early in the period.  But it is in the right ballpark. 
A more refined estimate confirms this.  Begin with 1929 through 1941 output in 
chained 2009 dollars from NIPA table 1.1.6.  Assuming 1929 was at potential, grow 1929 
output by 3.64 percent per year (simple compounding) to create a series of estimated 
potential output (see Field, 2011, for analysis of why potential grew so rapidly during 
these years).  This leaves 1941 actual output about 9.8 percent below potential, which is 
what is implied by Okun’s law and an assumed NAIRU of 5 percent.  Calculate the 
output gap for each year and cumulate, which yields $3.706 trillion in 2009 dollars, 
relative to an average potential of $1.321 trillion, for a cumulative output loss of 2.8 years 
of average potential over the years 1929-41.  If one were to used David Weir’s series for 
employment during the depression,43 which includes federal emergency workers, for 
example those in the Works Projects Administration (WPA) and the Civilian 
Conservation Corp (CCC), unemployment rates would be lower, and so would the 
cumulated output loss, probably closer to two years, which would narrow the difference 




Cumulative Output Losses: Summary of Four Episodes 
 
 
Episode Cumulative Loss 
2009$ 
Cumulative Loss in Years 
Relative to Average Potential  
1929-1941 $3.7 trillion 2.81 
1981-1984 $.9 trillion .15 
1990-1998 $1.4 trillion .14 
2007-2026 $41.7 trillion 2.15 
 
                                                 
43 Carter et al, 2006, Historical Statistics, series Ba477. 
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The cumulative loss that is already and will likely be associated with the Great 
Recession and slow recovery is therefore very large.   In absolute terms and as a fraction 
of average potential GDP it dwarfs the cumulative output loss between 1990 and 1998, 
almost none of which can be attributed to the S&L insolvencies.  It is an order of 
magnitude higher than losses associated with either the 1990-91 or the 1982 recessions, 
and unlike those earlier two episodes, the link between financial crisis and recession and 
slow recovery is both clear and widely acknowledged. It is a reminder of how important 
it is to implement a regulatory and supervisory structure likely to reduce the probability 
of a future disaster comparable in magnitude or perhaps even more severe than that 
experienced in 2007-09.44  Table 1 summarizes the four estimates of cumulative output 
loss developed in this paper.45 Although the research in this paper focuses on the period 
starting with the Great Depression, the work of James, McAndrews, and Weiman (2013) 
on the period from 1866 through 1914 reflects a somewhat similar approach. 
9.  Financial Disturbances and Output Loss 
Estimates of a cumulative output gap are influenced by forecasts and projections of 
actual as well as potential output.  The most volatile private sector determinants of actual 
output in the short run are autonomous consumption and the three components of gross 
                                                 
44 Much of the reform efforts were focused around increasing capital requirements.  Kane (2014) argued 
forcefully that this was insufficient, that we also need to make legal changes, expanding the fiduciary duties 
of loyalty, competence, and care that financial managers currently owe to stockholders to include 
taxpayers, who have an (implicit) equity stake in firms covered by a safety net.  At present, duties toward 
taxpayers are limited to those explicitly covenanted. (Kane also advocated establishing a dedicated 
academy to train bank regulators).   The absence of fear of prosecution allows managers, stockholders and 
creditors of financial institutions to take money from taxpayers with impunity. But the larger problem is 
that in pursuit of their objectives, financial sector actors engender and exacerbate the financial fragility that 
creates significant threats to the real economy.   
45 The loss associated with 1974-75 is not explored here.  The causes of that recession were quite different 
– negative supply shocks associated with the quadrupling of the price of a barrel of crude oil -- and 
financial crisis as a trigger has been neither suggested nor implicated. 
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private domestic fixed investment: residential construction, nonresidential construction, 
and producer durables (equipment and software). If any one or a combination of these 
declines sharply, and if this drop in aggregate demand is not compensated for by an 
increase in net exports, consumer durables or government spending on goods and 
services, a recession is almost certain.   
Regardless of the degree of leverage involved in financing the housing construction 
boom that peaked in 2005, overbuilding would, upon the boom’s termination, have 
depressed residential construction, leading to a modest deficiency in aggregate demand 
that, unless compensated for by sufficient fiscal and monetary stimulus on the part of the 
government or Federal Reserve, or increasing net exports, would have driven a wedge 
between actual and potential.  Even allowing for a healthy multiplier, however, this 
decline is far too small to account for the downturn threatened or actually experienced.  
The fragility of the financial sector meant that a self-reinforcing set of influences dragged 
down private sector consumption and investment spending much further. 
 One channel which has received considerable attention in recent years focuses on the 
possible effect of financial crisis on intermediation. In 1983, Ben Bernanke published a 
paper proposing a ‘credit channel’ through which financial crisis might contribute to 
cumulative output loss.  To the degree that crisis led to bank failures there could be 
systemic loss of information about potential borrowers that would raise the costs of credit 
intermediation.  Bernanke’s mechanism, however, is unlikely to be as relevant for the two 
main episodes considered here as it may have been for the Great Depression and earlier 
financial crises.  For the S&L episode, there were of course hundreds of insolvencies.  
But those that failed were generally so permeated with self-dealing and other forms of 
 58 
fraud that it is hard to imagine that their departure represented an adverse shock to the 
macroeconomy in the form of a deterioration in the quality or increase in the costs of 
credit intermediation. Moreover, output loss was modest between 1991 and 1998, and the 
links to the insolvencies tenuous.  For the Great Depression as well as 2007-09, output 
loss was of course substantial.  But for 2007-09, the mechanism also lacks much 
relevance because, with the exception of Lehman Brothers, remediation largely prevented 
financial institution failure.   
Once a recession deepens and persists, an additional set of effects may influence 
the trajectory of potential output.  These pertain to physical capital, human capital, and 
labor.  With respect to physical capital, relaxed standards for granting credit during a 
boom can result in misallocation, one dimension of which can be long overhangs of 
residential or nonresidential structures as well as equipment far in excess of current or 
immediate future needs.  More damaging, from the perspective of the evolution of the 
economy post-disturbances, is the possibility that physical capital will be ill-suited, not 
just in quantity, but in design, configuration and location with respect to future needs. 
Since equipment is by definition moveable, this concern applies particularly to structures.  
In some cases poorly chosen investment in structures can render an economy worse off 
than had the capital formation not taken place (Field, 1992). That is, the physical as well 
as the financial legacy of the credit boom may contribute to the slow private sector 
recovery and persisting output gap, thus affecting the post-disturbance trajectory of both 
actual and potential. 
As was emphasized in the 1992 CBO report, misallocation of physical capital 
during a credit boom may adversely affect the growth trajectory of potential output. But 
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in a credit boom whose termination is associated with a true financial crisis, this damage 
will almost certainly be dwarfed by the lost output associated with the subsequent 
recession and slow recovery, losses which can reflect both a persisting gap between 
actual and potential, and a deterioration of potential resulting from an enduring gapj 
If a credit boom can result in an overhang of excess structures and equipment, it is 
also true that a long period in which output lies below potential will likely result in 
shortfalls in new physical capital formation as well as consumption compared to what 
would have transpired in the absence of an output gap.  The investment shortfalls do not 
have the same immediate effect on living standards as do consumption shortfalls, but they 
may (after overhangs are exhausted) result in a private sector capital stock, and a capital-
labor ratio, lower than would have been the case in an environment of smoother and less 
disrupted physical capital accumulation. This prospect can, but may not, be 
counterbalanced by the positive supply side influence of fiscal stimulus in the form of 
well-chosen government R and D or infrastructural investment, which can complement 
private sector commitments and increase the growth of total factor productivity (Field, 
2011). Of course, to the degree such stimulus is undertaken, the cumulative output loss 
will be smaller and terminate sooner, and the possible detrimental influences of recession 
on the trajectory of potential output will also be of less concern.  As noted, however, it 
has been rare that the effects on output of a macroeconomically significant financial 
disturbance have been more than partially mitigated. 
With respect to labor, the immediate consequences of a downturn may not be so 
damaging, since out of work or underemployed workers may conclude that this is a good 
opportunity to pursue a professional or advanced degree, or pay for additional training.   
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As the downturn proves to be more prolonged, however, pessimism and discouragement 
generally sets in, as forecasts of the likely returns from such investments are revised 
downwards.   For the long term unemployed there can be reduced labor market 
attachment and a decay of job related skills including but not limited to the psychological 
discipline necessary for successful participation in the workforce. These effects will show 
up in a reduction of total factor productivity and labor productivity growth.  Older 
workers discouraged by a long bout of unemployment may leave and never reenter the 
labor force.  
It is also possible that the longer term trajectory of potential output might benefit 
from recession, with adversity stimulating creative responses with persisting positive 
effects.  There is historical evidence for some sectors suggesting the operation of such a 
mechanism (see Field, 2013). It is highly probable, however, that negative effects of 
prolonged recession on potential output predominate. That is the rationale for attributing 
most of the post-2008 downward revision of the trajectory of potential to the cumulative 
effect of operating the economy below potential for multiple years.  If an athlete suffers a 
serious injury and is bedridden for months, muscle tone and bone density will deteriorate, 
and there will come a point where some of the effects are irreversible. The athlete’s 
trajectory of potential will bend downward to help close the gap with actual. 
10.  Discussion and Conclusion 
The S&L insolvencies are no longer considered “the worst financial crisis since the 
Great Depression.” That title has been usurped by 2007-09.  But the phrase now refers to 
something very different in size and significance.  As this paper has shown, the two sets 
of events are an order of magnitude apart in terms of damage to the real economy and/or 
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the sensitivity of possible damage to the timing, character, and amount of remediation. 
Reassessment of the insolvencies and their consequences underlines how important it is 
to differentiate between disturbances posing a significant (and possibly catastrophic) 
threat to the real economy, and those which “merely” involve criminal misconduct and 
struggles over the allocation of losses among creditors and/or taxpayers. And how 
important it is to identify institutions that might fall into the former category before the 
onset of disturbances, when there is an opportunity for calm and careful inquiry.  
Discussion of macroeconomic damage triggered by financial failure were absent in 
the 1990s post-mortems on the significance of the S&L insolvencies. If we agree to the 
common description of them as a debacle we might well now ask, when is a debacle not a 
crisis? If we accept this paper’s criterion for designating financial disturbances as a 
financial crisis, the answer is: when it has little or no impact on aggregate output or 
employment. Imagine that domestic hackers, facilitated by lax security, raided the 
checking accounts of the United States Treasury, making off with $200 billion.  A 
debacle? Perhaps. But not a financial crisis.  We’d all likely have to pay a little more 
taxes, and this would just balance the gains to the thieves.  There would be little or no 
effect on the macroeconomy.  Because the S&Ls were not systemically important, their 
failures, with or without remediation, posed little threat to the trajectory of output and 
employment. 
When confronted with the impending failure of a financial institution, or set of 
institutions, it has often proved almost impossible for policy makers to determine whether 
or not it is, or they are, systemically important.  This is a hugely important for political as 
well as economic reasons because bailing out institutions whose failure would not 
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threaten the macroeconomy is much harder to justify from a national perspective. The 
Dodd-Frank Act represents a halting and imperfect step towards addressing this problem, 
in particular by forcing consideration of the consequences of financial firm failure in 
advance of the possible event.  As it stands, however, the aims of policy and/or reform 
continue most of the time to be phrased in terms of the objective of preserving the 
‘stability’ of the US financial system which in practice has often meant preserving the 
firms that comprise it.46  Preserving financial stability should be a national policy 
objective only to the degree it prevents significant damage to the real economy.  It should 
not be a public objective in and of itself, any more than should be preserving the stability 
of the computer industry. 
The preamble to Dodd-Frank reads:  “An Act to promote the financial stability of 
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, 
to end ‘‘too big to fail’’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”  Aside from 
Section 123, which calls for a “study of the effects of size and complexity of financial 
institutions on capital market efficiency and economic growth”, there is no explicit 
reference to the possible impact of failures on actual or potential output.  Perhaps that is 
considered to be so obvious as to be unnecessary.  Yet the reference to the 
macroeconomy in section 123 strikes one almost as an afterthought. It should be front 
and center, and if it is not, we risk losing sight of the crucial distinction between the 
national interest in protecting the real economy, and the interest of private actors in 
protecting individual wealth holdings.   
                                                 
46Blinder (2013) is one of the few consistently to emphasize this connection. 
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If the preservation of large interconnected firms will be justified ex post on the 
grounds they are analogous to the plumbing or circulatory system of the economy 
(Blinder, 2013, p. 6), then, like water or sewer lines, they should be publicly owned, or 
like electric and gas companies, regulated as public utilities.  Unlike water, sewer, gas or 
electric lines, however, there is no obvious case that financial firms are natural 
monopolies, and therefore no self-evident reason why breaking up some of the larger 
units would have negative efficiency consequences.47 There is a road still to travel in our 
legislative language and in our thinking about these matters. We need to focus more 
directly and consistently on the potential for damage to the real economy, and less on the 
“stability” per se of the financial sector.  
 The recession and slow recovery between 1990 and 1998 resulted in a cumulative 
output loss equal to about 14 percent of average GDP at the time, an order of magnitude 
lower than that associated with 2007-26 and beyond.  The relative magnitudes are, 
however, only part of the problem, because there is little reason to believe that the output 
loss during the earlier period had much to do with what had been going on with the 
S&Ls. Because of this, the timing, character, and amount of remediation is largely 
irrelevant in considering the subsequent macroeconomic trajectory.  The institutions that 
failed, considered either individually or collectively, were not large enough, complex 
enough, or interconnected enough to threaten a global financial crisis. If the 
postponement of reckoning had dragged on for several more years, the looting would 
have been worse, the commercial construction boom would have been worse, the drain 
                                                 
47 In seeking mergers as the “least cost” means of resolving many failed institutions, the FDIC has 
contributed to the growth of large units, in a way that may not turn out to be least cost in the longer run.  
Was it essential on efficiency grounds for JP Morgan Chase to absorb Washington Mutual, or for Wells 
Fargo to absorb Wachovia? Again, Dodd-Frank involves imperfect steps in the right direction. 
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on some taxpayers would have been worse, the scandals would have been worse, but it 
would not have threatened to bring down the entire US and world economy. 
It is clear that legislative interventions, particularly the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (1980) and Garn-St Germain (1982), in 
conjunction with regulatory actions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board initiated 
under Richard Pratt, postponed the reckoning at a very substantial cost to some taxpayers 
and the industry itself.  And it is also true that the eventually successful efforts of 
regulators such as William Black in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the San 
Francisco and Dallas Home Loan Banks helped prevent an even larger drain on the 
federal treasury.  Had the country waited another several years, the cost to clean up the 
industry would have been greater (Black, 2005).  
Suppose however there had been no remediation of the failed S&Ls.  The losers 
would have been mostly individuals, many of them high net worth rate chasers who had 
taken advantage of brokered deposits and the federal deposit guarantee.  They had not by 
and large leveraged themselves to acquire these S&L liabilities, and had they had to bear 
the losses the macroeconomic impact would likely have been small, just as the losses 
associated with the dot.com collapse appear to have had relatively little macroeconomic 
impact.  
Interconnection matters.  When a financial institution fails, it matters whether the 
losses stop with its immediate creditors, or whether their impairment impairs those who 
may have lent to them, and so on.  Limiting leverage is critical in controlling the threat 
that too much interconnection can pose to a financial system.  It is central to the logic of 
those advocating higher capital requirements (Admati and Hellwig, 2013). 
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  Although, with the introduction and diffusion of NOW accounts, S&Ls had 
increasingly come to resemble more traditional depository institutions with which they 
had been historically contrasted, a trend accelerated by legislative and regulatory changes 
in the 1980s, their role in the US economy was simply not as central as those whose 
existence was threatened in 2007-2009.    
 
Why then did the S&L follies attract so much attention?  In part because it was a 
great story. It featured colorful heroes and villains, and many prurient and salacious 
details.  The news industry, having failed to sound alarums during the run up to the 
insolvencies, compensated in spades when the institutions started failing and the tab for 
taxpayers began to mount.  There was much to get angry about. Ordinary citizens (aside 
from those holding high interest rate CDs from the failing institutions) were outraged at 
the cost of the government bailout.  And there was much over which to salivate. The 
narrative featured prostitutes, cocaine, high living, fraud, and real criminals who were 
actually and eventually put in jail. Before their fall the political reach of individuals like 
Charles Keating extended to the upper house of the United States Congress, casting a pall 
over the reputations of a former astronaut (John Glenn) as well as a future presidential 
candidate (John McCain).  Hundreds of white collar criminals went to jail, although 
many more escaped punishment due to limited prosecutorial resources.  All of this 
created a brew irresistible to vendors of newspapers, magazines, and books, as well as to 
the scholarly community. 
        But when we look at the S&L events in the shadow of a financial crisis like 2007-
09, we conclude that from a macroeconomic standpoint, it was mostly vapors.  The 
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institutions that failed were systemically unimportant.  There was no spike in the TED 
spread. The failures had almost no discernible effect on financial sector corporate profits.  
The impact of commercial structure overbuilding and/or misallocation was heavily 
localized. The US did experience a recession and slow recovery that began in 1990 and 
extended to 1995, but this had little to do with the S&L travails. In any event, the 
cumulative output gap was a small fraction, relative to contemporaneous GDP, of that 
associated with 2007-2026`.  The insolvencies did not usher in a prolonged period of 
household and financial sector deleveraging retarding recovery. 
Figure 5










































































 Source: Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts (2012), Table B100, lines 4 and 33. 
This verdict on macroeconomic significance applies to the effects on output and 
employment during the 1990s. Nevertheless, although that impact pales in comparison 
with the potential and actual damage from what has taken place in the twenty first 
century, the developments and legislation that contributed to the S&L insolvencies are 
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part of a trajectory of financial deregulation and rising ratios of private sector debt to 
GDP that helped lay the foundations for the truly systemic financial crisis that hit at the 
end of the 2000s.  
The years of greatest S&L excesses in lending contributed to a substantial and 
sustained upward shift in the ratio of mortgage debt to housing value in the US economy.  
That ratio remained below 33 percent throughout the 1970s and stood at 31.1 percent in 
1984.  Over the next seven years the ratio increased dramatically, to 38.3 percent.  It then 
grew more slowly through 1997, when it peaked at 42.3 percent, remaining at or below 
this level through 2005, the year housing construction peaked.  It shot up to 60 percent in 
2009 and remained high thereafter, but this was largely although not entirely due to the 
more than $6 trillion collapse in nominal housing values between 2006 and 2011. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts (2014, June 5 release), Table B100, lines 4 and 33. 
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Figure 5 plots values through 2005, drawing particular attention to the steep rise in 
the debt to value ratio between 1984 and 1991, the years of the greatest excesses in the 
industry.  The most highly publicized fraudulent lending was in the area of commercial 
real estate, but S&L liberality in lending on residential housing between 1984 and 1991 
was associated with what became a new normal in terms of the extent of household 
borrowing on residential housing. 
The rise in mortgage debt (debt and nominal house value through 2013 are 
illustrated in figure 6) was an important contributor to the increase in the overall ratio of 
household debt to income beginning in the 1980s which, along with increased labor force 
participation, particularly among women, allowed consumption levels for the bottom 80 
percent of households to continue to rise in the face of stagnant real hourly earnings and 
sharply increasing wealth and income inequality. This analysis provides another 
perspective on the macro financial trends, particularly the growing importance of 
mortgage lending in financial sector activity identified by Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 
(2014). 
Legislation enacted in response to the S&L insolvencies reflected a philosophical 
shift away from the consensus that had driven New Deal responses to the 1920s and had 
given the country a half century of relatively crisis free finance.  Faith in the “market” 
and distrust of government and regulation were a key part of the Reagan administration’s 
ideological armament, and there is continuity of purpose in these policy areas extending 
through the Clinton years and into the administration of George W. Bush. Regulatory and 
legislative responses represented way stations in the dismantling of the New Deal regime.  
An increasingly influential ideology hostile to government and regulation, selectively 
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applied, amplified the effects of the pursuit of gain, both directly through the operation of 
financial institutions and indirectly through the political process.  Liberalized asset 
powers, the elimination of Regulation Q, cuts in the number of S&L examiners and 
starving the FSLIC and Federal Home Loan Bank Board of federal funds needed for 
remediation turned out, hardly surprisingly, to be a recipe for an increased drain on the 
Treasury.  
Financial innovation in the remediation of the S&L insolvencies also contributed to 
what followed fifteen years later.  Methods developed by the Resolution Trust 
Corporation for disposing of distressed commercial real estate assets in the aftermath of 
the S&L insolvencies, particularly the N-series mortgage trust programs, helped provide 
the template for the tranched collateralized mortgage backed securities subsequently so 
enthusiastically embraced (see Geltner, 2013, p. 31). Developed and extended by private 
firms, these derivative securities were an integral feature of the growing financial 
fragility that made the U.S. and world economy so vulnerable when housing prices 
ceased rising and began to decline after 2005. 
An additional legacy of the S&L insolvencies may have been this:  because the 
remediation costs, although much complained about at the time, were comparatively 
small, because the recession and slow recovery associated with the insolvencies was mild 
and apparently not connected in any serious way to them, and because the amount of any 
cumulative output loss associated with the insolvencies, if any, was likely relatively 
insensitive to the character, timing, and amount of remediation, policy makers may have 
developed unjustified confidence in the ability of the macroeconomy to weather the 
consequence of a credit fueled construction boom. They were therefore less inclined in 
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the 2000s to express much interest in the ways in which continuing financial innovation, 
extensions of the shadow financial system, and their interaction, were creating a far more 
fragile and potentially explosive system. 48  Once the collapse gathered steam, the fragile 
system turned out to be very sensitive to the character, timing, and amount of 
remediation, placing much greater responsibility on policy makers than they had no doubt 
anticipated.  The 2007-09 financial crisis was very different from the S&L insolvencies 
because it involved much larger financial institutions whose balance sheets were linked 
by multiple interconnections. It was in that respect more severe than the financial 
disturbances associated with the onset of the Great Depression. 
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